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Short	Abstract	We	propose	a	novel	account	of	episodic	memory	function	based	on	a	conceptual	and	empirical	analysis	of	its	role	in	belief	formation.	We	provide	a	critique	of	the	view	that	episodic	memory	serves	 future-directed	 imagination,	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 central	 features	 of	 this	 capacity	 can	instead	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 role	 it	 plays	 in	 human	 communication.	 On	 this	 view,	 episodic	memory	allows	us	to	communicatively	support	our	interpretations	of	the	past	by	gauging	when	we	 can	 assert	 epistemic	 authority.	 This	 capacity	 is	 ineliminable	 in	 justiYication	 of,	 and	negotiations	about,	social	commitments	established	by	past	interactions.	
Long	Abstract		Episodic	 memory	 has	 been	 analyzed	 in	 a	 number	 of	 different	 ways	 in	 both	 philosophy	 and	psychology,	 and	 most	 controversy	 has	 centered	 on	 its	 self-referential,	 ‘autonoetic’	 character.	Here,	we	offer	a	comprehensive	characterization	of	episodic	memory	in	representational	terms,	and	propose	a	novel	functional	account	on	this	basis.	We	argue	that	episodic	memory	should	be	understood	as	a	distinctive	epistemic	attitude	taken	towards	an	event	simulation.	On	this	view,	episodic	memory	 has	 a	metarepresentational	 format	 and	 should	 not	 be	 equated	with	 beliefs	about	the	past.	Instead,	empirical	Yindings	suggest	that	the	contents	of	human	episodic	memory	are	often	constructed	in	the	service	of	the	explicit	justiYication	of	such	beliefs.	Existing	accounts	of	episodic	memory	function	that	have	focused	on	explaining	its	constructive	character	through	its	 role	 in	 ‘future-oriented	 mental	 time	 travel’	 neither	 do	 justice	 to	 its	 capacity	 to	 ground	veridical	beliefs	about	the	past	nor	to	its	representational	format.	We	provide	an	account	of	the	metarepresentational	 structure	 of	 episodic	 memory	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 role	 in	 communicative	interaction.	The	generative	nature	of	recollection	allows	us	to	represent	and	communicate	the	reasons	for	why	we	hold	certain	beliefs	about	the	past.	In	this	process,	autonoesis	corresponds	to	the	capacity	to	determine	when	and	how	to	assert	epistemic	authority	in	making	claims	about	the	past.	A	domain	where	such	claims	are	 indispensable	are	human	social	engagements.	Such	engagements	commonly	require	the	justiYication	of	entitlements	and	obligations,	which	is	often	possible	only	by	explicit	reference	to	speciYic	past	events.	
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Humans	are	obsessed	with	their	own	past.	A	large	part	of	our	conscious	mental	lives	is	spent	with	reminiscing	about	past	experiences	and	sharing	 those	experiences	with	others	 (Desalles,	2007a;	Rimé	et	al.,	1991).	Psychologists	have	identiYied	the	basis	of	this	obsession	as	originating	in	 episodic	memory.	 Since	Endel	Tulving	 (1972)	 introduced	 the	 concept,	 the	 idea	 that	human	long-term	declarative	memory	 can	be	 partitioned	 into	 two	 separate	 systems	—	one	 semantic	and	one	episodic	—	has	become	virtually	universally	accepted	across	the	Yield.	This	agreement,	however,	 has	 done	 little	 to	 clarify	 more	 basic	 questions	 about	 the	 function	 of	 the	 episodic	memory	system.	Traditionally,	most	memory	research	has	been	pre-occupied	with	studying	the	capabilities	of	human	memory	rather	than	aiming	to	illuminate	its	function.	Given	the	centrality	and	ubiquity	of	 episodic	memory	 in	our	 lives,	 it	 is	 surprising	 that	 the	question	of	 the	 ‘proper	function’	(Millikan,	1984)	of	episodic	memory	has	received	attention	only	in	recent	years	(Boyer,	2008,	 2009;	 Conway,	 2005;	 Cosmides	 &	 Tooby,	 2000;	 Klein	 et	 al.,	 2002;	 Michaelian,	 2016;	Schacter,	Guerin,	&	St.	Jacques,	2011;	Suddendorf	&	Corballis,	1997;	2007).		In	the	present	article,	we	will	argue	that	common	accounts	of	episodic	memory	function	have	serious	 shortcomings,	 and	propose	 an	 alternative	 functional	 analysis.	 To	 do	 this,	we	will	 Yirst	have	to	explain	what	constitutes	our	object	of	investigation.	Despite	the	central	role	it	plays	in	the	study	of	human	memory,	the	concept	of	episodic	memory	is	surprisingly	hard	to	pin	down.	Thus,	 in	 Section	1,	we	will	 give	 and	defend	 a	 precise	 characterization	 of	 episodic	memory.	 In	Section	2,	we	will	 scrutinize	 the	most	popular	 account	of	 episodic	memory	 function:	 the	 idea	that	our	capacity	to	remember	the	past	functions	in	the	service	of	our	capacity	to	imagine	the	future.	Finally,	in	Section	3,	we	propose	an	alternative	account	that	views	episodic	memory	as	a	mechanism	 supporting	 human	 communication	 speciYically	 tailored	 to	 certain	 forms	 of	cooperative	social	interactions.		On	this	view,	episodic	memory	turns	out	to	be	crucial	to	the	human	capacity	to	communicate	about	 past	 events.	 While	 it	 is	 commonly	 acknowledged	 that	 episodic	 memory	 is	 both	ontogenetically	(Nelson,	1993;	Nelson	&	Fivush,	2004)	and	phylogenetically	(Suddendorf,	Addis	&	Corballis,	2009;	Desalles,	2007b)	connected	to	our	capacity	 to	communicate	about	 the	past,	the	exact	nature	of	this	connection	is	usually	left	underspeciYied.	We	will	propose	that	episodic	memory	 is	 essential	 to	 managing	 our	 discursive	 commitments	 by	 demarcating	 the	 range	 of	beliefs	 about	 which	 we	 can	 claim	 epistemic	 authority.	 The	 capacity	 to	 manage	 such	commitments	 in	 turn	 contributes	 to	 the	 stabilization	 of	 human	 communication:	 by	 taking	responsibility	 for	 the	 truth	 of	 an	 assertion	 (which	 comes	 at	 potential	 costs)	 speakers	 can	provide	reasons	for	listeners	to	believe	them.	Most	importantly,	this	account	can	make	sense	of	why	episodic	memory	should	be	self-referential—a	question	that	has	been	left	unresolved	in	the	literature	so	far.	Moreover,	this	account	can	make	sense	of	a	range	of	empirical	phenomena	that	are	not	obviously	reconcilable	with	competing	explanations.		Overall,	our	strategy	will	be	to	reason	from	form	to	function:	from	the	design-features	of	the	episodic	memory	system	 identiYied	at	 the	outset,	we	will	 infer	 the	cognitive	 tasks	 this	 system	has	 likely	been	selected	 to	solve.	Nonetheless,	our	account	will	not	make	any	claims	as	 to	 the	actual	evolutionary	history	of	episodic	memory,	and	will	only	address	the	mature	system	as	 it	operates	 in	human	adults.	While	our	account	 carries	 implications	 for	what	one	 should	expect	the	 development	 of	 episodic	 memory	 to	 look	 like	 and	 how	 far	 it	 should	 be	 shared	 between	humans	and	other	animals,	these	questions	will	not	be	our	focus	here.	
1.	What	is	episodic	memory?	The	 term	 ‘episodic	memory’	 has	 entered	 into	 the	 repertoire	 of	 cognitive	 psychology	 some	time	ago,	 and	 is	 often	presented	as	 roughly	 corresponding	 in	 function	 to	 the	use	of	 the	word	‘remembering’	 (Tulving,	 1985;	 Gardiner,	 2001).	 The	 fact	 that	 we	 seem	 to	 have	 no	 trouble	identifying	 instances	 of	 remembering	 in	 everyday	 life,	 however,	 obscures	many	 cognitive	 and	conceptual	subtleties	in	relation	to	episodic	memory.	The	term	is	often	used	in	slightly	different	ways	by	authors	with	differing	theoretical	inclinations. 		1
	SpeciYically,	 it	 is	not	always	clear	how	the	distinction	between	episodic	memory	and	autobiographical	memory	 is	1drawn.	 We	 take	 autobiographical	 memory	 to	 refer	 to	 knowledge	 about	 the	 ‘self,’	 and	 take	 the	 fact	 that	 episodic	amnesiacs	 do	 not	 always	 lose	 this	 kind	 of	 knowledge	 to	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	 distinguishing	 between	 these	 concepts	(Klein,	Loftus,	&	Kihlstrom,	1996;	Klein	&	Ganghi,	2010;	Picard	et	al.,	2013).	On	our	understanding,	autobiographical	memory	is	a	speciYic	kind	of	memory	content,	which	can	be,	but	is	not	necessarily,	represented	in	episodic	memory.	
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Human	 memory	 is	 typically	 partitioned	 into	 separate	 systems	 along	 two	 axes	 (Squire,	1992a):	declarative/procedural	and	long-term/short-term.	Within	this	taxonomy,	there	are	two	separate	 declarative,	 long-term	 memory	 systems:	 semantic	 memory	 and	 episodic	 memory.	Hence,	the	effort	to	understand	episodic	memory	has	traditionally	focused	on	identifying	those	of	its	features	that	distinguish	it	from	semantic	memory.		Tulving	 (1972)	 originally	 deYined	 episodic	memory	 as	memory	 for	 personally	 experienced	past	events.	Episodic	memory,	on	this	conception,	was	thought	to	uniquely	include	information	about	what	 happened,	when	 and	where	 (so-called	WWW	 information).	 However,	 this	 kind	 of	information	can	be	represented	in	semantic	memory	as	well	(Klein,	2013a):	recall	the	storming	of	the	Bastille.	Tulving	(1983;	1985;	2002a)	thus	subsequently	amended	his	deYinition	by	adding	that	 episodic	 memory	 is	 distinguishable	 from	 semantic	 memory	 because	 of	 its	 unique	phenomenology.	 While	 information	 in	 semantic	 memory	 is	 thought	 to	 be	 simply	 ‘known,’	episodic	 memory	 comes	 with	 ‘mental	 time	 travel’:	 when	 we	 remember	 an	 event,	 we	 re-experience	 the	 event	 as	 it	 occurred.	Tulving	 labelled	 the	different	phenomenological	 states	of	semantic	versus	episodic	memory	as	‘noetic’	and	‘autonoetic’	consciousness,	respectively.		Partly	due	to	the	phenomenological	nature	of	 this	distinction,	much	discussion	has	 focused	on	what	autonoesis	 should	be	 taken	 to	be .	From	 this	debate	 two	main	 lines	of	 thinking	have	2emerged.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 authors	 such	 as	 Russell	 and	 colleagues	 (Clayton	&	 Russell,	 2009;	Russell	 &	 Hanna,	 2012;	 Russell,	 2014;	 for	 a	 similar	 view	 see	 Hills	 &	 ButterYill,	 2015)	 have	proposed	a	‘minimal’	characterization	of	episodic	memory.	On	this	view,	episodic	memories	are	re-experienced,	 and	 thus	distinguished	 from	semantic	memory	by	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 contents	are	 WWW-elements	 bound	 together	 into	 a	 holistic	 representation.	 That	 is,	 because	 such	memories	have	spatio-temporal	 structure	 (such	 that	predicates	 like	 ‘next	 to’,	 ‘before’	or	 ‘after’	can	be	 applied	 to	 their	 elements),	 and	 include	perspectivity	 as	well	modality-speciYic	 sensory	information,	 they	 carry	 all	 the	 features	of	 ongoing	 experience.	 Further,	 because	 such	 episodic	memories	would	 represent	 completed	 events,	 they	 could	 be	 identiYied	 as	 ‘past’	 in	 a	minimal,	non-conceptual	sense	(Russell	&	Hanna,	2012).	Autonoesis	might	then	simply	be	a	by-product	of	the	‘quasi-experiential’	character	of	such	recalled	events.		On	the	other	hand,	many	have	argued	that	episodic	memory	 includes	more	 than	 just	event	information	(Dokic,	2001;	Klein,	2013a;	2014;	2015;	Klein	&	Nichols,	2012;	Perner	&	Ruffman,	1995;	 Perner,	 2001;	 Perner,	 Kloo,	 &	 Stöttinger,	 2007).	 On	 this	 view,	 when	 we	 remember	 an	episode,	we	represent	more	than	just	the	event	itself;	we	further	represent	that	we	had	personal	experience	 of	 the	 event	 in	 question.	 SpeciYically,	 Dokic	 (2001)	 has	 argued	 that	 we	 should	understand	the	difference	between	episodic	memory	and	other	types	of	memory	as	lying	in	the	fact	 that	 “genuine	 episodic	 memory	 gives	 the	 subject	 […]	 a	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 the	information	 carried	 by	 it	 does	 not	 essentially	 derive	 from	 testimony	 or	 inference	 but	 comes	directly	 from	 the	 subject’s	 own	 past	 life”	 (p.	 4).	 This	 view	 is	 supported	 by	 Klein	 and	Nichols’	 (2012)	 report	 of	 the	 case	 of	 patient	 RB,	 who	 seems	 to	 have	 lost	 the	 capacity	 to	autonoetically	 remember	 the	 past.	 This	 patient	 reported	 having	 lost	 the	 capacity	 to	 non-reYlectively	tell	“from	the	Yirst	person,	‘I	had	these	experiences’”	(p.	690).	Autonoesis	thus	seems	to	carry	propositional	content	to	the	effect	that	the	information	in	question	was	acquired	Yirst-hand.	To	account	for	this	circumstance,	‘self-reYlexive’	views	of	autonoesis	usually	take	episodic	memory	to	be	metarepresentational.	After	all,	to	represent	that	one’s	memory	is	the	outcome	of	a	 past	 experience,	 one	 has	 to	 represent	 the	 representational	 character	 of	 the	 memory	 itself	(Perner,	1991). 		3
	Autonoesis	is	sometimes	understood	as	a	form	of	phenomenal	consciousness.	We	take	such	a	characterization	to	be	2unhelpful	for	a	functional	explanation	as	long	as	it	does	not	offer	an	account	of	what	information	is	speciYically	carried	by	 this	 phenomenology.	 The	 characterization	 of	 autonoesis	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 phenomenology	 alone	 does	 not	 explain	anything,	 but	merely	describes	 a	 feature	of	 episodic	memory,	which	 should	be	 an	 explanandum	 for	 any	 functional	account.	Here,	we	adopt	Perner’s	 (1991;	2012)	view	of	a	metarepresentation	as	a	 ‘representation	of	a	representation	as	a	3
representation.’	This	 formulation	 is	 stronger	 than	conceptualizations	proposed	by	other	authors	who	conceive	of	 a	metarepresentation	 as	 merely	 a	 ‘representation	 of	 a	 representation’	 (e.g.,	 Sperber,	 2000).	 However,	 our	characterization	 of	 episodic	 memory	 as	 metarepresentational	 in	 this	 strong	 sense	 does	 not	 entail	 that	 all	metarepresentations	must	be	of	this	kind.
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1.1.	The	structure	of	episodic	memory	We	will	now	propose	a	characterization	of	episodic	memory	trying	to	reconcile	the	two	views	described	above.	Thereby,	we	will	distinguish	between	the	contents	of	episodic	memory,	on	the	one	hand,	and	its	representational	format,	on	the	other.		
1.1.1.	The	contents	of	episodic	memory	Episodic	memory	shares	many	features	with	other	capacities,	such	as	imagination,	dreaming,	navigation,	 counterfactual	 thinking,	 and	 future	planning	 (Addis	et	al.,	2008;	Buckner	&	Caroll,	2006;	 De	 Brigard,	 2013;	 Hassabis,	 Kumaran,	 Vann,	 &	 Maguire,	 2007;	 Hassabis,	 Kumaran,	 &	Maguire,	 2007;	 Schacter,	 Addis,	 &	 Buckner,	 2007;	 Spreng,	 Mar,	 &	 Kim,	 2008).	 The	 common	denominator	of	all	 these	different	capacities	seems	 to	be	 that	 they	are	subserved	by	a	system	that	Ylexibly	constructs	richly	contextualized	scenarios	on	the	basis	of	stored	content	(Hassabis	&	Maguire,	2007;	2009).	The	neural	substrate	of	this	‘scenario	construction	system’	is	localized	in	 the	 medial	 temporal	 lobes,	 speciYically	 in	 the	 hippocampus	 (Buckner,	 Andrews-Hanna,	 &	Schacter,	 2008;	 Cheng,	Werning,	&	 Suddendorf,	 2016;	Maguire	&	Mullally,	 2013).	 Constructed	scenarios	 are	 thought	 to	 consist	 in	 simulations	 of	 events	 extended	 in	 time	 and	 space	 (Moser,	Kropff,	&	Moser,	2008),	and	construction	of	a	given	scenario	has	been	shown	to	activate	sensory	cortex	 in	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 the	 perception	 of	 that	 scenario	 (Wheeler,	 Petersen,	 &	 Buckner,	2000).	Crucially,	 however,	 scenario	 construction	 has	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 stored	 information	(i.e.,	 the	memory	 trace),	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 episodic	memory,	 on	 the	 other.	While	 there	 is	debate	 about	 what	 exactly	 memory	 traces	 should	 be	 taken	 to	 be	 (De	 Brigard,	 2014;	 Robins,	2016a),	there	is	little	disagreement	in	that	they	are	not	identical	to	the	outputs	of	the	scenario	construction	 system	 (Cheng	 et	 al.,	 2016). 	 Instead,	 scenario	 construction	 enriches	 and	4recombines	 trace	 information	 depending	 on	 the	 function	 its	 output	 serves.	 Scenario	construction	subserves	a	 range	of	different	capacities,	not	 just	episodic	memory:	 Imagination,	dreaming,	navigation,	planning,	etc.,	make	use	of	memory	traces,	too.	All	of	these	capacities	are	supported	by	our	ability	 to	store	and	retrieve	 information	 learned	 in	speciYic	situations	 in	 the	past.	One	 way	 to	 understand	 the	 construction	 process	 in	 episodic	 memory	 retrieval	 is	 as	 a	Bayesian	inference	with	the	aim	to	accurately	reconstruct	a	past	event	on	the	basis	of	available	evidence	 (Hemmer	&	Steyvers,	2009;	De	Brigard,	2012;	2013).	This	 evidence	 comes	 from	 the	memory	traces	on	the	one	hand	and	relevant	semantic	 information	on	the	other	(Cheng	et	al.,	2016).	Depending	on	the	functional	role	a	given	construction	will	play,	the	construction	process	will	then	rely	more	or	less	heavily	on	the	memory	trace	or	semantic	information.	For	example,	the	construction	of	a	counterfactual	or	future-oriented	scenario	should	rely	less	heavily	on	trace	as	compared	to	semantic	information.	Indeed,	patients	with	semantic	dementia	have	been	found	to	be	impaired	in	constructing	event	simulations	about	the	future	(Irish	et	al.,	2012).	Some	authors	have	proposed	a	radical	constructivist	view	of	episodic	remembering,	positing	that	memory	 traces	 essentially	 play	 no	 privileged	 role	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 contents	 of	episodic	 memory	 (e.g.,	 Michaelian,	 2016).	 Instead,	 these	 authors	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 no	difference	 between	 inferences	 involved	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 factual	 and	 counterfactual	scenarios	(De	Brigard,	2013).	However,	as	Robins	(2016b)	has	argued	based	on	an	analysis	of	common	 memory	 errors	 (such	 as	 the	 famous	 DRM	 effect;	 Roediger	 &	 McDermott,	 1995),	episodic	memory	 construction	 cannot	 be	 entirely	 constructed.	 She	 argues	 that	 such	memory	errors	can	only	occur	because	some	information	has	been	retained.	Thus,	while	it	seems	likely	that	the	construction	process	does	not	have	to	rely	on	trace	information,	it	will	commonly	take	trace	information	into	account.	In	particular,	there	must	be	differences	in	the	way	construction	processes	 make	 use	 of	 stored	 information	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	 function	 of	 the	construction	is	to	represent	an	actual	or	possible	occurrence.	That	is,	in	constructing	a	scenario	representing	an	actual	past	event,	the	construction	process	should	assign	a	privileged	role	to	the	memory	trace	in	assigning	probabilities	to	different	priors.		
	While	we	do	not	have	the	space	to	go	into	defending	a	speciYic	view	of	memory	traces	here,	we	do	not	want	to	be	4understood	as	claiming	that	traces	literally	‘encode’	events.	The	trace	itself	is	not	an	event	representation	but	rather	consists	merely	of	information	allowing	the	hippocampus	to	reconstruct	or	reinstate	a	given	event	representation	(a	similar	view	is,	for	example,	defended	by	De	Brigard,	2013;	2014;	and	Werning,	personal	communication).	
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The	contents	of	episodic	memory	are	then	the	outputs	of	a	scenario	construction	mechanism.	Such	constructions	would	qualify	as	‘minimal’	episodic	memory:	they	are	‘quasi-experiential’	in	the	 sense	 of	 including	 spatio-temporal	 context,	 perspectivity,	 and	 modality-speciYic	 sensory	information.	Scenario	construction	could	then	be	taken	to	be	sufYicient	for	the	representation	of	speciYic	past	events.	
1.1.2.	The	format	of	episodic	memory	Scenario	 construction	 alone	 is,	 however,	 not	 sufYicient	 for	 episodic	 memory	 to	 occur:	hippocampus-based	 constructions	 become	 episodic	 memories	 only	 when	 they	 are	conceptualized	 in	 a	 certain	way;	 namely	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 past	 Yirst-person	 experience.	 The	event	 construction	 itself	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 differentiate	 between	 imagined	 and	 remembered	scenarios.	For	 this	reasons,	 some	authors	have	proposed	 that	autonoesis	serves	as	a	 ‘memory	index’:	a	representational	tag	differentiating	episodic	memories	from	imaginations	(Michaelian,	2016;	Klein,	2013c).	On	this	view,	the	difference	between	imagined	and	remembered	scenarios	equates	 to	 the	 difference	 between	 factual	 and	 counterfactual	 events.	 Autonoesis	 would	 then	allow	us	 to	differentiate	between	 factual	and	counterfactual	events.	However,	 if	 the	content	of	autonoesis	 is	 indeed	 a	 proposition	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 “I	 had	 these	 experiences,”	 it	 alone	 cannot	differentiate	counterfactual	from	factual	event	representations.	Instead,	autonoesis	marks	those	events	of	which	one	had	Yirst-hand	experience	as	opposed	to	some	other	source.	To	see	this,	note	that	both	remembering	and	imagining	a	particular	past	event	are	compatible	with	the	belief	that	the	event	indeed	occurred.	One	can	(even	accurately)	imagine	a	past	event,	which	 one	 believes	 to	 have	 occurred.	 This	 is,	 in	 fact,	 common	 when	 we	 represent	 events	 of	which	 we	 have	 only	 second-hand	 information	 (see	 also	 Pillemer	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Thus,	 while	autonoesis	does	indeed	serve	as	a	‘memory	index,’	it	does	so	by	effectively	distinguishing	event	representations	according	to	their	source.	Further,	if	autonoesis	is	not	part	of	the	content	of	the	construction,	 it	 must	 be	 an	 outcome	 of	 second-order	 processes	 speciYic	 to	 episodic	 memory	occurring	 at	 retrieval	 (Klein,	 2013a;	 Klein	 &	 Markowitsch,	 2015;	 Wheeler,	 Stuss,	 &	 Tulving,	1997).	 The	 mechanisms	 of	 episodic	 retrieval	 have	 long	 been	 a	 neglected	 area	 of	 memory	research	(Roediger,	2001).	An	exception	to	this	has	been	the	‘source	monitoring	framework’	by	Johnson	 and	 colleagues	 (Johnson	 &	 Raye,	 1981;	 Johnson	 et	 al.,	 1993).	 These	 authors	 have	argued	 that	 episodic	 retrieval	 involves	 monitoring	 processes	 that	 determine	 the	 source	 of	retrieved	 information.	 According	 to	 Johnson	 (2005),	 episodic	 memory	 is	 in	 fact	 nothing	 but	source	memory. 		5A	similar	perspective	has	been	proposed	by	Cosmides	and	Tooby	(2000;	see	also	Klein	et	al.,	2004),	 who	 argue	 that	 the	 appropriate	 functional	 role	 that	 a	 given	 output	 of	 scenario	construction	ought	to	play	in	inference	is	dependent	on	its	source.	This	in	turn	necessitates	that	the	contents	of	the	construction	be	representationally	decoupled	from	their	direct	relationship	to	reality.	This	is	accomplished	by	applying	a	source	tag	to	these	contents,	which	governs	how	they	 can	be	 further	used	 in	 inference.	 Indeed,	 source-monitoring	mechanisms	seem	 to	 Yill	 the	role	 of	 such	 decoupling	 processes;	 they	 ‘endorse’	 contents	 under	 a	 given	 description	(Michaelian,	2012a;	2012b).		This	 process,	 Cosmides	 and	 Tooby	 argue,	 is	 best	 described	 as	 the	 application	 of	 an	appropriate	epistemic	attitude. 	 In	the	case	of	episodic	memory,	 the	attitude	of	 ‘remembering’	6corresponds	 roughly	 to	 the	 proposition	 “has	 been	 obtained	 through	 Yirst-hand	 informational	access.”	Cosmides	and	Tooby	go	on	to	propose	similar	attitudes	for	imagination,	planning,	etc.	Of	course,	 attitudes	 cannot	 be	 indiscriminately	 applied	 to	 any	 content;	 for	 example,	 one	 cannot	
	Note	that	our	claim	that	 the	content	of	autonoesis	refers	 to	 the	source	of	a	memory	says	nothing	about	 the	exact	5mechanisms	 producing	 this	 content.	 One	 possibility	 is	 that	 autonoesis	 is	 simply	 the	 product	 of	 source	 and	 reality	monitoring	processes	 (Johnson,	2005).	But	other	possibilities	 exist:	Michealian	 (2016),	 for	 example,	 proposes	 that	autonoesis	 is	 an	outcome	of	 a	distinct,	 ‘process	monitoring’	mechanism.	Here	we	merely	 commit	 to	 the	 claim	 that	autonoesis	proper	is	not	an	outcome	of	the	event	construction	process	itself,	but	depends	on	a	second-order	process.		Metarepresentations	can	be	constructed	from	any	representation,	not	 just	propositional	ones.	Thus,	we	chose	the	6term	epistemic	attitude	here	to	highlight	that	the	metarepresentation	involved	in	episodic	memory	can	be	viewed	as	analogous	to	a	propositional	attitude	in	that	it	governs	the	epistemic	status	of	its	content,	but	differs	importantly	in	that	 it	 can	 apply	 to	 content	which	 is	 itself	 not	 entirely	 propositional.	 Nonetheless,	 not	 all	 epistemic	 attitudes	 are	metarepresentational	(see	below).
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remember	 a	 future	 event.	 However,	 this	 proposal	 makes	 sense	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 same	simulation	 of	 a	 speciYic	 past	 event	 can	 both	 be	 remembered	 and	 imagined.	 Moreover,	 since	attitudes	 can	 be	 recursively	 embedded,	 this	 view	 can	 accommodate	 the	 fact	 that	we	 can	 (for	example)	remember	imagining.	In	effect,	the	processes	involved	in	source	monitoring	can	thus	be	 described	 as	 resting	 on	 a	 complex	 metarepresentational	 ‘grammar,’	 in	 which	 different	attitudes,	each	with	their	own	epistemic	status,	can	be	embedded	within	each	other	to	establish	the	epistemic	status	of	the	construction	as	a	whole.	Crucially,	this	view	preserves	the	strengths	of	the	minimal	view	of	episodic	memory	(Russell	&	 Hanna,	 2012)	 in	 accounting	 for	 the	 distinctive	 phenomenology	 involved,	 while	 also	accommodating	 the	 intuition	 underlying	 self-reYlexive	 views,	 according	 to	 which	 episodic	content	is	not	enough	for	episodic	memory	to	occur	(Klein,	2013a).	Autonoesis	is	here	taken	to	be	 an	 outcome	 of	 the	 capacity	 to	 metarepresentationally	 embed	 outputs	 of	 the	 scenario	construction	system	under	the	epistemic	attitude	of	remembering.	
1.1.3.	Event	memory	and	episodic	memory	Hippocampus-based	 event	 constructions	 do	 not	 have	 to	 be	 embedded	 under	 a	metarepresentational	 attitude	 in	 order	 to	 support	 behavioral	 decisions.	 This	 at	 least	 is	suggested	 by	 Yindings	 showing	 that	 the	 hippocampus	 is	 implicated	 in	 implicit	memory	 tasks	(Hannula	&	Greene,	2012;	Olsen	et	al.,	2012;	Sheldon	&	Moscovitch,	2010).	That	is,	scenarios	of	speciYic	past	events	can	be	represented	as	having	occurred	without	the	attitude	of	remembering	being	applied.		Note	 that	 ‘believing’	 is	 an	 epistemic	 attitude	 as	 well;	 albeit	 one	 that	 does	 not	 necessarily	require	the	metarepresentation	of	its	contents.	Arguably,	we	adopt	the	attitude	of	‘believing’	to	semantic	memories	by	default.	Thus,	if	the	same	attitude	is	applied	to	constructed	scenarios,	we	should	 expect	 their	 content	 to	 acquire	 inferential	 properties	 similar	 to	 semantic	 information.	However,	while	they	do	not	differ	in	content	(they	are	about	speciYic	past	events)	believed	event-simulations	are	not	episodic	memories.		Instead,	 we	 reserve	 the	 term	 event	 memory	 for	 this	 kind	 of	 representation	 (for	 a	 similar	proposal,	 see	 Rubin	 &	 Umanath,	 2015).	 Such	 event	 memories	 might	 differ	 from	 full-blown	episodic	memories	 in	 that	 they	 include	 source	 information	 only	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 allowing	 the	distinction	 among	 different	 events	 (Crystal	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 are	 not	 located	 in	 subjective	 time	(Nysberg	et	al.,	2010),	are	not	necessarily	subject	to	conscious	awareness	(Dew	&	Cabeza,	2011;	Hannula	&	Ranganath,	2008;	Henke,	2010;	Moscovitch,	2008),	are	not	self-referential	(Rubin	&	Umanath,	2015),	and	do	not	have	‘narrative	structure’	(Keven,	2016).		Such	a	distinction	between	event	and	episodic	memory	 is	at	 least	 tentatively	supported	by	Yindings	from	several	 lines	of	research.	 Infants	demonstrate	some	capacity	for	recalling	events	(Bauer	&	Leventon,	2013;	Mullaly	&	Maguire,	2014),	but	only	between	the	ages	of	three	and	Yive	years	 children	 begin	 to	 access	 event	 information	 as	 the	 source	 of	 their	 beliefs	 (Haigh	 &	Robinson,	 2009).	 Moreover,	 the	 outputs	 of	 the	 hippocampus	 are	 not	 necessarily	 conscious	(Henke,	 2010)	 but	 nonetheless	 inform	 eye-movement	 behavior	 in	 implicit	 memory	 tasks	(Hannula	&	Greene,	2010).	 In	 fact,	 eye-movements	 can	 serve	as	an	 implicit,	 veridical	 index	of	event	memory,	which	can	dissociate	from	explicit	responses	(e.g.,	Hannula	et	al.,	2012).	On	the	side	of	neuropsychology,	the	case	of	RB	mentioned	above	demonstrates	that	it	is	possible	to	lose	the	 capacity	 to	 remember	 events	 autonoetically	 without	 losing	 the	 ability	 to	 access	 event	information	as	such	(Klein	&	Nichols,	2012).		The	 concept	 of	 event	 memory	 thus	 allows	 us	 to	 take	 seriously	 the	 mnemonic	 abilities	 of	young	children	(e.g.,	Burns,	Russell,	&	Russell,	2015;	Clayton	&	Russell,	2009;	Fivush	&	Bauer,	2010)	 and	non-human	 animals	 (e.g.,	 Corballis,	 2013;	 Clayton	&	Dickinson,	 1998;	Gupta	 et	 al.,	2010;	 Martin-Ordas	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 2013;	 Templer	 &	 Hampton,	 2013)	 without	 necessarily	attributing	to	them	capabilities	for	episodic	memory	in	the	same	sense	as	human	adults	possess	them	(Tulving,	2005;	Redshaw,	2014).	Thus,	event	memory	most	likely	differs	in	function	from	episodic	memory,	and	we	will	focus	here	on	a	functional	explanation	for	the	latter.	
1.2.	Remembering	and	believing	the	occurrence	of	past	events	One	 consequence	 of	 viewing	 episodic	 memory	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 application	 of	 a	distinctive	epistemic	attitude	is	that	remembering	has	to	be	distinguished	from	believing.	This	might	seem	counter-intuitive	because	we	usually	believe	whatever	we	remember.	Nonetheless,	
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psychologists	 commonly	 distinguish	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 occurrence	 of	 an	 event	 from	 episodic	memory	 of	 the	 same	 event	 (Blank,	 2009;	 Fitzgerald	&	 Broadbridge,	 2013;	Mazzoni	 &	 Kirsch,	2002;	Rubin,	Schrauf,	&	Greenberg,	2003;	Scoboria	et	al.,	2014).	What	then	should	we	take	the	relationship	between	remembering	and	believing	to	be?	
1.2.1.	Epistemic	generativity	Crucially,	when	we	remember	we	do	not	simply	generate	two	representations:	a	belief	 that	the	 event	 in	 question	 happened	 and	 an	 episodic	 memory	 of	 the	 event.	 Instead,	 these	representations	 are	 inferentially	 connected:	 we	 take	 ourselves	 to	 have	 knowledge	 about	 the	event	in	question	because	we	had	Yirst-hand	access	to	it.	Perner	and	Ruffman	(1995;	followed	by	Suddendorf	 &	 Corballis,	 1997;	 2007)	 took	 this	 circumstance	 to	 imply	 that	 episodic	 memory	requires	a	form	of	causal	understanding;	namely	the	capacity	that	informational	access	leads	to	belief.	They	tested	this	 idea	by	 investigating	whether	there	 is	a	correlation	between	children’s	episodic	memory	ability	and	their	ability	to	infer	‘knowing’	from	‘seeing’.	Notwithstanding	that	Perner	and	Ruffman	did	indeed	Yind	such	a	correlation,	 it	seems	to	us	that	what	 is	 involved	in	episodic	memory	is	not	only	a	capacity	to	infer	‘knowing’	from	‘seeing’	but	to	further	represent	the	sources	of	one’s	own	present	beliefs	as	sources	in	the	Yirst	place	(Haigh	&	Robinson,	2009).		As	we	have	argued	above,	 episodic	memory	 in	 some	sense	 just	 is	 a	 speciYic	 type	of	 source	memory.	 When	 we	 remember,	 the	 content	 of	 the	 memory	 no	 longer	 functions	 as	 an	 event	representation	but	instead	as	the	source	of	a	present	belief.	Representing	the	source	of	a	belief	requires,	but	importantly	goes	beyond,	the	inferences	involved	in	ascribing	knowledge/belief	on	the	basis	of	informational	access.	In	the	latter	case,	one	simply	takes	note	of	the	fact	that	a	given	agent	has	appropriate	informational	access	to	X	and	from	this	circumstance	infers	that	she	now	knows	X.	From	the	fact	that	Anna	has	looked	inside	the	box,	Ahmed	infers	that	she	knows	what	is	 inside	 it.	 In	 the	 former	 case,	 however,	 one	 has	 to	 additionally	 represent	 the	 inferential	relationship	holding	between	 the	episode	of	 informational	access	and	 the	knowledge	state.	 In	this	 case,	 from	 the	 fact	 that	Anna	 looked	 inside	 the	box,	Ahmed	 infers	not	 only	 that	 she	now	knows	what	is	inside	but	also	that	this	is	so	because	she	has	seen	it.		In	other	words,	 to	represent	 the	source	of	a	given	belief	 requires	 the	representation	of	 the	kind	 of	 justiYication	 that	 this	 belief	 has	 received.	 Therefore,	 on	 our	 account,	 the	 represented	relation	between	a	given	past	episode	of	informational	access	and	a	given	present	belief	is	one	of	justiYication.	Episodic	memory	requires	the	capacity	to	understand	not	only	that	‘seeing’	leads	to	‘knowing’	but	further	that	‘seeing’	justiYies	claims	to	‘knowledge.’	Another	way	to	frame	the	distinction	between	episodic	memory,	event	memory	and	semantic	memory	would	 be	 according	 to	 their	 respective	 role	 in	 belief	 formation:	 in	 contrast	 to	 event	memories	 and	 semantic	 memories,	 episodic	 memories	 are	 not	 beliefs	 but	 rather	 provide	grounds	 for	 believing.	 In	 more	 technical	 terms,	 event	 memory	 and	 semantic	 memory	 are	
epistemically	 preservative:	 they	 preserve	 the	 original	 justiYication	 of	 the	 endorsement	 of	 their	contents	 through	 time.	 In	 contrast,	 episodic	memory	 is	 epistemically	 generative :	 it	 generates	7present	 justiYication	 for	 why	 we	 should	 endorse	 its	 contents	 (Burge,	 1993;	 Dokic,	 2001;	Matthen,	 2010).	When	we	 remember	 a	 given	 event,	 the	 fact	 that	we	 remember	 supports	 our	belief	 that	 this	 event	 indeed	 occurred	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	 provides	 a	 reason	 for	 this	 belief	 (Teroni,	2014;	 see	 also	 Audi,	 1995).	 If	 you	 episodically	 remember	 that	 you	were	walking	 on	 the	 Red	Square	last	August,	you	believe	that	this	is	indeed	what	you	did	simply	because	you	remember	it.	Other	types	of	memory,	on	this	conception,	are	different	exactly	because	they	do	not	include	a	justiYication	 of	 their	 own	 contents.	 When	 we	 retrieve	 information	 non-episodically,	 we	 ‘just	
	The	term	‘generative’	is	sometimes	used	to	describe	the	view	that	episodic	memory’s	contribution	to	the	formation	7of	knowledge	is	the	production	of	new	belief(-content)	due	to	 its	constructive	character	(Michaelian,	2011).	This	 is	then	commonly	contrasted	with	‘preservative’	semantic	memory,	which	merely	‘preserves’	beliefs	formed	in	the	past	without	 adding	 to	 their	 content.	 This	 way	 of	 framing	 the	 distinction	 is	 certainly	 appropriate	 to	 describe	 the	differences	between	event	memory	and	semantic	memory.	As	far	as	episodic	memory	is	concerned,	however,	we	want	to	be	clear	 that	we	adopt	 the	term	of	 ‘epistemic	generativity’	 to	 illustrate	 that	only	episodic	(but	neither	event	nor	semantic)	memory	produces	present	justi@ication	for	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	constructed	content.
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know’	without	also	‘knowing	why	we	know.’ 		8
1.2.2.	Memory-belief	congruency	Remembering	and	believing	thus	stand	in	a	relation	of	justiYication	in	which	the	fact	that	we	remember	justiYies	our	beliefs	about	past	events.	If	this	is	the	case,	we	might	expect	the	contents	of	 episodic	memory	 to	 be	 largely	 veridical	 so	 as	 to	 provide	 normatively	 appropriate,	 reliable	grounds	for	our	beliefs.	 In	particular,	we	should	not	expect	our	beliefs	themselves	to	have	any	inYluence	on	what	we	remember.	As	 illustrated	 by	 Neisser’s	 (1981)	 famous	 case	 study	 of	 the	 memory	 of	 John	 Dean,	 the	question	of	what	it	means	for	a	memory	to	be	veridical	is	not	a	straightforward	one	(Koriat	and	Goldsmith,	 1996).	 Dean,	 a	 former	 counsel	 to	 president	 Richard	 Nixon	 during	 the	 ‘Watergate’	affair,	 provided	 testimony	 that	was	 in	 essence	often	 correct	 but	 contained	many	 (mostly	 self-serving)	 incorrect	 details.	While	 it	 seems	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 episodic	memory	 is	 usually	 reliably	veridical	 to	 a	 signiYicant	 extent,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 long	 tradition	 of	 research	 pointing	 out	 the	fallibility	of	this	system.	Starting	with	Bartlett’s	(1932)	classic	treatment,	an	impressive	amount	of	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 construction	 process	 on	 which	 episodic	 memory	 relies	 is	surprisingly	 error-prone.	 Both	 encoding	 and	 retrieval	 processes	 typically	 alter	 information	substantially	 (e.g.,	 Alba	 &	 Hasher,	 1983;	 Roediger,	 1996;	 Schacter,	 2001).	 Crucially,	 one	important	 line	 of	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 beliefs	 play	 an	 unexpectedly	 large	 role	 in	 the	construction	of	episodic	memories	(Conway,	2005;	Ross,	1989;	Blank,	2009).	In	many	situations,	construction	seems	to	be	guided	by	one’s	current	beliefs	about	whatever	is	to	be	remembered	rather	 than	 the	memory	 trace	 itself.	 If	 the	 construction	 process	 underlying	 episodic	memory	were	 indeed	optimized	 to	support	beliefs	about	actual	occurrences,	 such	a	 trade-off	would	be	unexpected.	Evidence	 for	 top-down	 inYluences	on	episodic	memory	comes	 from	a	range	of	experiments	investigating	 the	 effects	 of	 post-hoc	 manipulation	 of	 participants’	 attitudes,	 expectations	 or	appraisals	on	their	memories.	It	is	usually	found	in	these	studies	that	people	remember	the	past	inaccurately	but	congruent	with,	and	supportive	of,	their	newly	acquired	beliefs.	For	example,	in	a	 study	 by	 Henkel	 &	Mather	 (2007),	 participants	were	 asked	 to	make	 a	 choice	 between	 two	options	each	of	which	had	an	equal	amount	of	positive	and	negative	features	associated	with	it.	When	asked	to	remember	their	choice	later,	however,	participants	misremembered	the	features	of	 the	 options	 they	 chose	 as	more	 positive	 than	 they	were	 (see	 also	Benney	&	Henkel,	 2006;	Mather	 &	 Johnson,	 2000;	 Mather,	 ShaYir,	 &	 Johnson,	 2000;	 2003).	 Crucially,	 this	 shift	 was	dependent	on	what	participants	believed	they	had	chosen	irrespective	of	their	actual	choice	(see	also	Pärnamets,	Hall,	&	Johansson,	2015).	That	is,	here	participants	remembered	having	made	a	choice	 they	 did	 not	 actually	make	 (but	 believed	 they	 did),	 and	 additionally	 remembered	 the	option	they	believed	to	have	chosen	as	having	had	more	positive	features	than	it	actually	did.	In	other	words,	 they	displayed	both	memory	 congruency	with	 the	 induced	belief	 and	a	memory	distortion	supporting	this	belief.		Similar	 ‘congruency	 effects’	 have	 been	 found	 in	 such	 diverse	 domains	 as	 memory	 for	emotions	 (Levine,	 1997),	 attitudes	 (Rodriguez	&	 Strange,	 2015;	 Goethals,	 &	 Reckman,	 1973),	one’s	own	behaviors	(Ross	et	al.,	1983,	1981),	one’s	own	traits	(Santioso,	Fong,	&	Kunda,	1990),	and	 even	 one’s	 own	 clinical	 symptoms	 (Merckelbach,	 Jelicic,	 &	 Pieters,	 2010;	 2011).	 The	methods	 of	 these	 studies	 are	 diverse	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	 unclear	 to	what	 extent	 each	 of	 these	effects	is	speciYic	to	episodic	memory.	Evidence	suggesting	such	speciYicity,	however,	is	supplied	by	research	on	memory	manipulation.	By	now,	there	is	an	impressive	literature	showing	that	it	is	possible	to	induce	in	people	vivid,	detailed	 false	memories,	 which	 are	 subjectively	 indistinguishable	 from	 accurate	 recollections	(Lampinen,	Neuschatz,	&	Payne,	1997;	Payne	et	al.,	1996).	People	usually	create	false	or	altered	memories	in	response	to	having	changed	their	beliefs	about	a	given	event.	This	in	turn	is	usually	the	 outcome	 of	 having	 been	 exposed	 to	 persuasive	 communication	 (Nash,	 Wheeler,	 &	 Hope,	2014).	 In	 fact,	 persuasion	 is	 a	main	 factor	 in	 the	 effectiveness	 of	most	memory	manipulation	
	In	contrast,	perceptual	beliefs,	for	example,	are	entirely	transparent.	The	perceptual	character	of	the	belief	itself	only	8Yigures	 in	any	 inferences	drawn	 from	such	belief	 in	exceptional	circumstances	 (for	example	 in	realizing	 that	one	 is	subject	 to	 a	 perceptual	 illusion).	Our	 claim	here	 is	 that	while	we	often	 rely	 on	 information	 about	 past	 events	 in	 a	similarly	transparent	fashion,	in	episodic	memory	proper	the	representational	character	of	the	memory	itself	plays	a	part	in	the	inferences	we	draw	from	it	(see	Burge,	1993).
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paradigms	(Leding,	2012).	This	suggests	that	induced	beliefs	can	guide	constructive	retrieval.	On	 the	 basis	 of	 evidence	 about	 such	 belief-memory	 congruency	 effects	 it	 seems	 fair	 to	conclude	that	retrieval	has	a	 tendency	to	conYirm	prior	beliefs	rather	than	to	contradict	 them.	Such	 evidence	 then	 is	 not	 easily	 reconcilable	 with	 a	 view	 that	 takes	 episodic	 memory	 to	 be	exclusively	 aimed	 at	 re-constructing	 events	 in	 the	 way	 they	 actually	 occurred.	 Rather,	 these	studies	 show	 that	 the	 episodic	 construction	 process	 seems	 to	 just	 as	 often	 be	 geared	 toward	constructing	 event	 representations	 so	 as	 to	 be	 consistent	 with,	 and	 supportive	 of,	 our	 prior	beliefs.	 Commonsensically,	 we	 would	 assume	 episodic	 memory	 to	 be	 an	 exclusively	 belief-forming	system:	phenomenologically	 it	seems	to	us	that	we	form	beliefs	about	the	past	on	the	basis	of	remembering	it,	not	vice	versa.	In	contrast,	research	on	memory	illusions	suggests	that	beliefs	 about	 the	 past	 and	 episodic	 memory	 are	 reciprocally	 interconnected:	 Sometimes	 we	remember	an	event	because	we	believe	 it	occurred. 	And	 in	 turn,	once	we	have	constructed	a	9memory	on	the	basis	of	such	a	belief,	the	memory	itself	might	serve	to	strengthen	the	belief	that	induced	it.		Crucially,	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 episodic	memory	 is	 not	 commonly	 veridical.	 In	 fact,	 the	effects	 of	 prior	 beliefs	 and	 attitudes	 on	 subsequent	 memory	 seem	 to	 be	 highly	 context	dependent	(e.g.,	Eagly	et	al.,	2001).	Veridicality	in	episodic	memory	construction	is	not	an	all-or-nothing	affair.	Instead,	retrieval	processes	seem	to	aim	to	strike	a	balance	between	congruency	with	 memory	 traces	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 belief	 justiYication	 on	 the	 other.	 However,	 such	 a	balancing	act	is	not	always	possible.	In	some	such	cases	then,	remembering	an	event	will	lead	to	belief	revision,	while	in	others,	believing	that	an	event	occurred	will	lead	to	the	construction	of	an	event	simulation	without	a	corresponding	trace.	
1.3.	The	features	of	episodic	memory	We	 are	 now	 in	 a	 position	 to	 specify	 the	 features	 of	 episodic	 memory	 that	 any	 functional	account	should	be	able	to	account	for.	Episodic	memory	consists	of	an	epistemic	attitude	taken	towards	 the	 simulation	 of	 a	 speciYic	 past	 event,	 which	 serves	 to	 justify	 a	 belief	 about	 the	occurrence	of	this	event.	We	are	thus	in	agreement	with	Klein	(2015),	who	similarly	argues	that	episodic	memory	is	not	individuated	through	its	contents	alone	but	rather	through	the	manner	in	which	this	content	is	made	available.	More	formally,	episodic	memory	is	1. Quasi-experiential	The	representation	is	an	outcome	of	scenario	construction:	it	includes	spatio-temporal	structure,	perspectivity,	and	modality-speciYic	sensory	information.	2. Event	speciYic	The	representation	is	speciYic	to	a	single	spatio-temporal	context.	3. Past-directed	The	event	in	question	is	represented	as	having	occurred	in	the	past.		4. Autonoetic	Event	information	is	(meta-)represented	as	having	been	obtained	‘Yirst-hand.’	5. Epistemically	generative	The	memory	is	not	represented	as	a	belief	but	provides	grounds	for	believing.	Importantly,	 we	 take	 these	 features	 to	 be	 individually	 necessary	 and	 jointly	 sufYicient	 for	episodic	memory	to	occur.	Thus,	since	the	fact	that	episodic	construction	is	congruency	prone	is	not	necessary	to	episodic	memory,	we	did	not	list	it	as	a	separate	feature	here.	Nonetheless,	as	we	will	argue	below,	we	 take	congruency	proneness	 to	be	a	 functional	property,	 i.e.,	 a	 feature	rather	 than	a	bug,	 of	 this	 system.	Moreover,	we	 can	 separate	 this	 list	 of	 features	 according	 to	which	properties	pertain	to	the	content	vs.	the	format	of	episodic	memory.	While	features	(1)	–	(3)	 pertain	 to	 the	 content	 (and	 are	 thus	 shared	with	 event	memory),	 (4)	 –	 (5)	 pertain	 to	 the	format	of	episodic	memory.	The	differences	between	the	different	kinds	of	memory	capacities	discussed	above	are	illustrated	in	Table	1.	
	Compare	 this	 to	perceptual	processes	where	 it	 is	 a	 common	 trope	 to	point	out	 that	high-level	beliefs	do	not	and	9should	not	have	any	inYluence	on	what	we	perceive	(Firestone	&	Scholl,	2015).
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TABLE	1:	DIFFERENT	REPRESENTATIONAL	FEATURES	OF	EPISODIC	MEMORY,	EVENT	
MEMORY	AND	SEMANTIC	MEMORY	
2.	What	is	episodic	memory	for?		Adaptive	 function	 cannot	 be	 discerned	 by	 merely	 asking	 what	 a	 given	 cognitive	 ability	 is	useful	 for	 (Millikan,	 1984;	 Sperber	 &	 Hirschfeld,	 2004):	 one	 can	 use	 a	 pair	 of	 scissors	 as	 a	paperweight	but	 that	does	not	allow	one	to	 infer	 that	scissors	are	designed	for	keeping	paper	from	Ylying	away.	Rather,	 in	order	 to	arrive	at	an	estimation	of	 ‘proper’	 function,	one	needs	 to	identify	a	Yitness	relevant	problem,	which	the	mechanism	under	consideration	will	solve	more	efYiciently	than	comparable,	cheaper	alternatives.	This	then	allows	one	to	infer	that	the	capacity	in	question	has	been	retained	in	the	selection	process	because	of	its	differential	contribution	to	the	solution	of	said	task.	Applied	 to	 the	 current	 context,	 the	 question	 is	 therefore	 what	 Yitness-relevant	 problem	 is	solved	by	an	autonoetic	and	epistemically	generative	memory	system	for	past	events	(episodic	memory)	 that	 could	 not	 be	 solved	 by	 a	 memory	 system	 without	 these	 features	 (event	memory). 		10
2.1.	Future-oriented	mental	time	travel	Information	 about	 the	 past	 is	 important	 only	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	 enables	 us	 to	 make	 better	decisions	in	the	present	so	as	to	ensure	beneYits	in	the	future	(Klein	et	al.,	2000).	Some	authors	have	taken	this	constraint	very	literally,	viewing	episodic	memory	as	part	of	a	wider	system	that	has	 evolved	 to	 enable	 us	 to	mentally	 travel	 into	 the	 future	 (Michaelian,	 2016;	 Schacter	 et	 al.,	2007;	 Schacter	 &	 Addis,	 2007;	 Suddendorf	 &	 Corballis,	 1997;	 2007).	 The	 proponents	 of	 this	view	deliberately	frame	their	account	in	terms	of	mental	time	travel,	as	they	view	the	abilities	of	constructing	 the	 personal	 past	 and	 the	 personal	 future	 as	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 cognitive	system.	On	this	view,	the	capacity	for	episodic	memory	is	just	one	instantiation	of	a	wider	ability	to	 construct	 scenarios	 in	 time,	 the	 function	of	which	 is	 taken	 to	be	planning	 for	 and	 thinking	about	the	future.	Support	 for	 this	 mental	 time	 travel	 account	 comes	 from	 neuropsychology	 and	 cognitive	neuroscience.	On	the	side	of	neuropsychology,	it	has	been	found	that	patients	with	hippocampal	lesions	often	(not	always:	Maguire,	Varga-Khadem,	&	Hassabis,	2010)	do	not	only	lose	the	ability	for	 episodic	 memory	 but	 also	 the	 ability	 to	 imagine	 their	 personal	 future	 (Klein,	 Loftus,	 &	Kihlstrom,	2002),	as	well	as	to	imagine	counterfactual	scenarios	(Hassabis	et	al.,	2007).	On	the	other	 hand,	 functional	 neuroimaging	 studies	 have	 shown	 the	 activation	 of	 a	 common	 brain	network	when	participants	were	engaged	in	past	or	future-oriented	mental	time	travel	(Okuda	
Quasi-experiential Event	speciYic Past-directed Epistemically	generative Autonoetic
Episodic	memory Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event	memory Yes Yes (Yes) No No
Semantic	memory No Not	necessarily Not	necessarily No No
	Note	that	we	thus	take	the	primary	relevant	contrast	to	be	the	one	to	event	memory	and	not	to	semantic	memory.	10To	be	sure,	there	is	much	to	be	said	about	the	function	of	event	memory	(e.g.,	Nagy	&	Orban,	2016),	but	this	will	not	be	our	focus	here.
 10
et	al.,	2003;	Addis	et	al.,	2007).		From	this,	some	authors	have	concluded	that	episodic	memory	and	episodic	future	thinking	(Atance	 &	 O’Neill,	 2001;	 Szupnar,	 2010)	 draw	 on	 the	 same	 underlying	 cognitive	 process	 and	must	therefore	have	evolved	for	the	same	reason:	to	imagine	the	future	through	constructively	making	 available	 elements	 of	 the	 past,	 which	 can	 be	 Ylexibly	 recombined	 in	 the	 service	 of	simulation	 (Suddendorf	 &	 Corballis,	 2007;	 Schacter	 &	 Addis,	 2007;	 2009).	 That	 is,	 since	 the	future	is	what	determines	whether	one	will	 live	to	procreate,	this	aspect	of	mental	time	travel	should	 arguably	 be	 what	 caused	 humans	 to	 retain	 and	 develop	 an	 episodic	 system	 over	evolutionary	time.		
2.1.1.	Mental	time	travel	and	constructiveness	This	 view	 is	 usually	 presented	 as	 having	 the	 advantage	 of	 being	 able	 to	 explain	 the	constructive	character	of	episodic	memory:	imagining	the	future	requires	Ylexible	recombination	of	stored	event	information.	Since,	on	this	view,	selection	of	this	system	has	been	driven	by	the	future-directed	aspect,	the	past-directed	counterpart	must	be	similarly	constructive.	This	then	is	thought	 to	explain	 the	myriad	ways	 in	which	our	 reconstructions	of	 the	past	are	error-prone:	selection	has	simply	not	optimized	this	system	to	represent	the	past	accurately.	This	 account	 of	 constructiveness	 is,	 however,	 problematic,	 since	 it	 leaves	 us	 without	 an	explanation	 for	 why	 we	 should	 ever	 be	 able	 to	 reliably	 and	 veridically	 recall	 past	 events.	 If	evolutionary	selection	merely	constrained	our	ability	to	mentally	travel	in	time	insofar	as	it	was	useful	for	simulating	the	future,	retaining	the	actual	past	should	be	accidental.	The	future	is	not	just	a	replay	of	the	past,	and	to	assume	so	would	leave	us	unable	to	predict	events	based	on	new	contingencies.	We	take	it	that	this	is	exactly	why	this	account	is	attractive	as	an	explanation	of	constructiveness	 of	 episodic	memory.	 Episodic	memory	 is,	 however,	 also	 reliably	 veridical	 in	many	cases;	a	fact	that	becomes	mysterious	on	this	view.		
2.1.2.	Remembering	the	future	One	might	reply	that	recollection	of	the	actual	past	would	be	helpful	for	imagining	the	future:	our	 simulations	 of	 the	 future	 could	be	 enhanced	 if	we	 remembered	 the	past	 Yirst	 (Szupnar	&	McDermott,	2008).	Selection	then	might	have	ensured	veridicality	in	episodic	memory	because	of	 the	 beneYits	 an	 accurate	 representation	 of	 the	 past	 provides	 for	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	future.	To	be	sure,	in	order	to	imagine	the	future	it	is	important	to	retain	information	learned	in	the	 past,	 as	 this	 will	 highly	 constrain	 any	 inference	 as	 to	 what	 might	 happen	 in	 the	 future.	However,	it	is	not	clear	what	re-experiencing	the	past	episodically	does	for	simulating	the	future,	or	how	it	would	contribute	more	to	future	planning	than	what	semantic	memory,	extracted	from	past	experience,	could	supply.	As	emphasized	above,	episodic	memory	is	not	identical	to	stored	information,	and	mentally	traveling	back	to	the	past	will	not	itself	include	any	information	about	the	future.		In	fact,	if	past-	and	future-directed	mental	time	travel	operate	over	the	same	type	of	content	and	merely	differ	 in	 the	temporal	orientation	they	assign	to	 their	constructions,	 it	 is	not	clear	why	one	would	need	the	past-directed	aspect	at	all	to	imagine	the	future.	To	see	this,	note	that	inferring	what	might	happen	in	the	future	on	the	basis	of	an	episodic	memory	is	not	the	same	as	mentally	 traveling	 into	 the	 future	 in	 the	 sense	 required	 here.	 Suppose	 that	 the	 last	 time	 you	were	at	 the	swimming	pool	 there	was	a	 long	 line	at	 the	entrance.	When	planning	 to	go	 to	 the	swimming	pool	the	next	time,	you	might	recollect	this	fact	episodically	and	therefore	infer	that	there	will	likely	be	a	long	line	again	this	time.	Future	oriented	mental	time	travel,	however,	is	not	the	 outcome	of	 an	 explicit	 inference	 of	 this	 kind.	 Instead,	 in	 this	 case,	when	 you	 ask	 yourself	whether	you	should	go	to	the	swimming	pool	today,	you	might	imagine	that	there	will	be	a	long	line.	Of	course,	the	reason	that	this	piece	of	information	might	be	included	in	your	imagination	of	this	scenario	might	lie	in	the	fact	that	there	was	a	long	line	last	time	you	were	there,	and	you	might	even	be	able	to	infer	this	from	your	imagination.	Crucially,	however,	there	is	no	need	for	you	to	represent	this	when	constructing	your	future	swimming-pool	scenario.		It	 is	 thus	 telling	 that	 past-	 and	 future-directed	 mental	 time	 travel	 can	 be	 dissociated	 in	episodic	 amnesia	 (Maguire	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Schacter	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 The	 loss	 of	 the	 capacity	 for	episodic	memory	alone	does	not	 impair	signiYicantly	people’s	ability	 to	draw	inferences	about	the	 future.	 Episodic	 amnesiacs	 are	 not	 ‘stuck	 in	 time’:	 they	 understand	 what	 the	 future	 is	(Craver	 et	 al.,	 2014a),	 can	 make	 future-regarding	 decisions	 (Craver	 et	 al.,	 2014b)	 and	 show	
 11
discounting	of	future	rewards	(Kwan	et	al.,	2012).	The	claim	that	we	can	remember	the	past	in	order	to	imagine	the	future	then,	seems	unlikely	to	be	true.		
2.2.	Source	monitoring	as	a	way	to	guarantee	reliability	One	way	to	reconcile	the	claim	that	scenario	construction	evolved	to	simulate	future	states	of	affairs	with	 the	 fact	 that	 episodic	memory	 is	 nonetheless	 reliably	 veridical	 has	 been	 to	 posit	post-hoc	 monitoring	 systems	 operating	 over	 retrieved	 content	 (Michaelian,	 2012a;	 2012b;	2016).	 Michaelian 	 proposes	 that,	 because	 selection	 has	 not	 optimized	 the	 construction	11process	to	accurately	represent	the	past,	such	accuracy	must	be	ensured	post-hoc.	Since,	in	large	part,	 the	 accuracy	 of	 our	memories	 depends	 on	 their	 source,	 and	 episodes	 do	 not	 include	 a	‘source	tag’	specifying	their	origin,	the	source	has	to	be	inferred	by	monitoring	mechanisms	at	retrieval.	Without	such	mechanisms,	the	argument	further	goes,	episodic	memory	would	be	too	unreliable	 to	 be	 useful.	 While	 this	 assessment	 is	 certainly	 plausible	 as	 an	 account	 of	 how	episodic	memory	serves	as	source	memory,	 it	does	 little	 to	put	worries	about	 its	reliability	 to	rest.	The	questions	about	veridicality	raised	above	are	not	issues	about	source	information	but	rather	about	the	reliability	of	the	construction	process	itself.	Further,	from	an	evolutionary	perspective,	if	a	mechanism	carries	out	its	function	unreliably,	we	 should	 expect	 selection	 to	 act	 on	 the	 workings	 of	 this	 mechanism	 itself	 rather	 than	producing	an	additional,	expensive,	 second-order	monitoring	process.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	not	clear	 in	general	 why	 second-order	 processes	 would	 help	 if	 we	 cannot	 expect	 certain	 Yirst-order	processes	to	be	reliable.	After	all,	why	should	the	second-order	process	be	expected	to	be	any	more	reliable?	As	Kornblith	(2012)	has	pointed	out,	the	assumption	that	reYlection	can	serve	as	a	way	 to	 ensure	 the	 reliability	 of	 our	 Yirst-order	 beliefs	 generally	 leads	 to	 an	 inYinite	 regress	simply	 because	 reYlection	 cannot	 guarantee	 its	 own	 reliability	 (see	 also	 Mercier	 &	 Sperber,	2011).		
2.3.	Episodic	memory	as	an	epiphenomenon	It	seems	that	the	mental	time	travel	account,	with	its	focus	on	the	construction	process,	is	by	itself	unable	to	explain	episodic	memory.	As	Klein	(2013b)	has	argued,	future-oriented	mental	time	travel	differs	from	episodic	memory	in	important	respects.	We	have	argued	in	Section	1.1.3	that	 episodic	 memory	 is	 decidedly	 not	 identical	 with	 the	 outputs	 of	 scenario	 construction.	Indeed,	Cheng	et	al.	 (2016;	see	also	Michaelian,	2015)	have	pointed	out	that	autonoesis	 is	not	necessary	for	mental	time	travel	to	occur.	Admitting	 that	 episodic	 memory	 and	 mental	 time	 travel	 into	 the	 future	 are	 importantly	different,	a	proponent	of	 the	mental	 time	travel	account	might	say	 that	 the	ability	 to	mentally	travel	 into	the	future	simply	entails	the	ability	to	travel	 into	the	past	as	well.	On	this	view,	the	subjective	past	is	a	by-product	of	representing	subjective	time	at	all,	which	in	turn,	would	be	an	outcome	of	a	selection	process	driven	by	the	beneYits	of	imagining	the	future.	Episodic	memory	would	then	turn	out	to	be	an	epiphenomenon	of	our	ability	to	mentally	travel	into	the	future.		This,	however,	seems	equally	unlikely.	For	one,	the	evidence	cited	above	shows	that	one	can	retain	a	sense	of	the	subjective	future	without	the	subjective	past.	If	our	ability	to	traverse	the	subjective	 past	 was	 simply	 a	 necessary	 consequence	 of	 our	 ability	 to	 imagine	 the	 subjective	future,	 this	 should	 not	 be	 possible.	 Moreover,	 the	 subjective	 past	 and	 subjective	 future	 play	entirely	 different	 roles	 in	 our	 inferences	 and	 actions.	When	 you	 remember,	 for	 example,	 that	there	was	 an	 earthquake	 in	 your	 street	 last	 year,	 it	 simply	 does	 not	 have	 the	 same	 cognitive	consequences	as	imagining	that	there	might	be	an	earthquake	in	your	street	at	some	point	in	the	future.	From	this	insight	alone,	we	should	expect	episodic	memory	and	episodic	future	thought	to	play	different	roles	in	our	cognitive	ecology,	and	subsequently	be	subject	to	different	selection	pressures.		In	sum,	it	might	well	be	that	thinking	episodically	about	the	future	and	the	past	share	many	similarities,	because	 they	operate	over	 the	 same	 type	of	 content	 (i.e.,	 event	 simulations).	This	fact	alone,	however,	does	not	explain	why	we	have	the	ability	to	do	both.	
	Michaelian	(2016)	offers	a	more	extensive	discussion	of	the	issues	addressed	in	this	section	than	we	can	cover	here.	11Here	we	simply	point	out	what	we	perceive	to	be	the	most	central	of	our	disagreements	with	his	account.
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3.	The	communicative	function	of	episodic	memory	We	now	proceed	to	propose	a	novel	account	of	episodic	memory	function	in	two	steps.	First,	we	 address	 the	 format	 of	 episodic	 memory	 by	 providing	 an	 explanation	 of	 its	 epistemic	generativity,	autonoetic	character,	and	proneness	to	belief-congruency	(Sections	3.1	&	3.2).	In	a	second	step,	we	will	then	brieYly	address	the	question	of	why	such	a	capacity	is	required	for	the	representation	 of	 speciYic	 past	 events;	 that	 is,	 we	 address	 the	 content	 of	 episodic	 memory	(Section	3.4).	As	presented	above,	we	take	episodic	memory	to	play	a	generative	role	 in	the	 formation	of	our	beliefs.	To	get	at	the	proper	function	of	this	capacity,	 let	us	Yirst	consider	why	it	should	be	necessary	to	represent	our	own	reasons	in	support	our	beliefs	to	ourselves.	One	answer	to	this	question	 is	 provided	 by	 Cosmides	 and	 Tooby	 (2000):	 reasons	 delineate	 the	 conditions	 under	which	we	should	revise	the	beliefs	we	formed	on	their	basis.	Explicitly	representing	the	reasons	for	 every	 piece	 of	 endorsed	 information	 we	 hold,	 however,	 would	 be	 both	 unfeasible	 and	unnecessary.	It	would	be	unfeasible	because	it	would	require	that	we	store	the	causal	history	of	any	 and	 all	 inferences	 we	 draw,	 which	 would	 call	 for	 indeYinite	 storage	 and	 computational	capacity.	 And	 it	 would	 be	 unnecessary	 because	 mechanisms	 of	 belief	 update	 can	 be	implemented	in	a	manner	for	which	explicit	representation	of	‘reasons’	is	not	required	(such	as	Bayesian	belief	updating).	Thus,	commonly	we	simply	store	the	outcome	of	our	inferences	and	discard	the	history	of	the	inference	 itself.	 However,	 as	 Cosmides	 and	 Tooby	 (2000)	 also	 point	 out,	 a	 domain	 in	 which	reasons	are	regularly	useful	is	the	realm	of	human	communicative	interactions.	Humans	rely	on	communicated	 information	 to	 an	 extraordinary	 extent.	 Such	 reliance,	 however,	 comes	 with	challenges	 that	 necessitate	 the	 development	 of	 dedicated	 cognitive	 machinery.	 Part	 of	 this	machinery	is	the	handling	of	reasons	(Mercier	&	Sperber,	2011;	forthcoming).		Most	forms	of	communication	are	cooperative,	and	as	such	subject	to	the	same	evolutionary	constraints	 to	 stability	 as	 cooperation	 more	 generally	 (Tooby	 &	 Cosmides,	 1992).	Communicative	exchange	of	information	is	beneYicial	for	speakers	in	so	far	as	it	enables	them	to	inYluence	their	listeners’	mental	state.	Conversely,	 listeners	beneYit	from	communication	to	the	extent	 that	 they	 can	 distinguish	 reliable	 from	 unreliable	 signals	 in	 order	 to	 acquire	 useful	information	(Dawkins	&	Krebs,	1978;	Krebs	&	Dawkins,	1984).	As	such,	communication	systems	can	only	survive	in	the	selection	process	if	there	is	a	way	to	ensure	that	engaging	in	information	exchange	remains	beneYicial	 for	both	parties.	On	the	one	hand,	 if	there	were	no	way	to	ensure	that	signals	are	reliable	 (in	 the	 face	of	possible	deception	and	 incompetence),	 listeners	would	soon	stop	paying	attention	 to	 them.	On	 the	other	hand,	 if	 speakers	had	no	way	of	 inYluencing	their	 listeners’	mental	state	effectively	and	to	their	beneYit,	 they	would	stop	sending	messages	(Sperber,	2001).		On	 this	basis,	Sperber	et	al.	 (2010)	argue	 that	we	should	expect	humans	 to	have	evolved	a	suite	of	capacities	which	 let	us	—	as	receivers	—	scrutinize	communicated	 information	for	 its	veracity	 through	assessing	both	 its	 content	and	 its	 source.	The	mechanisms	allowing	us	 to	do	this	are	collectively	referred	to	as	epistemic	vigilance.	These	capacities	are	thought	to	provide	us	with	 means	 to	 avoid	 being	 misinformed	 either	 through	 an	 interlocutor’s	 incompetence	 or	deceptive	 intent.	 Conversely,	 speakers	 should	 be	 endowed	 with	 capacities	 allowing	 them	 to	effectively	inYluence	their	interlocutors.	According	to	Mercier	and	Sperber	(2011;	forthcoming;	Mercier,	2016)	one	way	this	capacity	manifests	is	in	our	ability	for	reasoning.	Reasoning	allows	us	to	argue	for	why	others	should	accept	whatever	we	are	claiming	by	providing	reasons	for	it.	Note	that	this	entails	that	epistemic	vigilance	and	our	ability	to	overcome	such	vigilance	must	be	reciprocally	interconnected.	The	better	listeners	are	at	scrutinizing	communicated	information,	the	 better	we	 should	 expect	 speakers	 to	 be	 at	 convincing	 their	 interlocutors,	 and	 vice	 versa.	Reasoning	 serves	 both	 to	 maximize	 the	 persuasive	 effects	 of	 one’s	 message	 as	 well	 as	 to	scrutinize	the	validity	of	the	content	of	received	messages.	Moreover,	one	way	a	speaker	might	maximize	the	persuasive	effect	of	her	message	would	be	to	turn	her	epistemic	vigilance	against	herself	 so	 as	 to	 simulate	 the	 likelihood	 that	 an	 interlocutor	 would	 perceive	 her	 intended	message	as	valid.	When	we	reason	privately,	we	 in	effect	anticipate	having	to	convince	others.	This	 picture	 suggests	 that	we	 should	 be	 able	 to	 produce	 reasons	 for	 our	 own	 beliefs	 and	 be	sensitive	to	the	quality	of	the	reasons	others	provide	for	their	assertions.		Communication	 then,	 is	 clearly	 a	 domain	 where	 having	 explicit	 access	 to	 reasons	 is	indispensable	 (for	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 of	 this	 claim	 see	 Mercier	 &	 Sperber,	 forthcoming).	 In	
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virtue	of	episodic	memory’s	generative	role	in	belief	justiYication,	we	might	therefore	expect	it	to	it	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 enabling	 certain	 kinds	 of	 justiYicatory	 reasoning	 on	 the	 one	hand	 and	supporting	epistemic	vigilance	on	the	other.		
3.1.	The	negotiation	of	epistemic	authority		Reasons,	if	we	are	to	identify	them	as	such,	are	metarepresentational.	Taking	p	as	a	reason	for	
q	 requires	more	 than	 representing	p	 and	 inferring	q	 from	 it:	 the	 fact	 that	p	 and	q	 stand	 in	 a	relation	 of	 justiYication	 must	 also	 be	 represented.	 Reasoning	 then	 is	 the	 activity	 of	 handling	inferences	 in	 a	 way	 that	 explicitly	 represents	 the	 justiYicatory	 relationships	 holding	 between	different	representational	contents.	Note	that	it	is	not	essential	that	a	justiYicatory	relationship	actually	obtains.	Rather,	what	matters	 is	 that	such	a	relationship	 is	 represented.	You	might	be	wrong	 in	 taking	 the	 fact	 that	 (1)	you	cannot	see	beyond	the	horizon	to	be	a	reason	to	believe	that	(2)	the	earth	is	Ylat.	However,	this	does	not	stop	you	from	taking	(1)	to	be	a	reason	for	(2).	According	 to	 the	 argumentative	 theory	 of	 reasoning,	 the	 capacity	 for	 representing	 reasons	evolved	not	 because	 it	 helps	us	 to	draw	better	 inferences	but	 to	 enable	us	 to	make	others	 to	draw	the	inferences	we	want	them	to	draw,	i.e.,	to	convince	them,	as	well	as	to	evaluate	others’	reasons	(Mercier	&	Sperber,	2011).	As	we	have	argued	above	(Section	1.2),	when	we	remember	we	represent	to	ourselves	why	we	 believe	 certain	 things	 about	 the	 past.	 In	 other	 words,	 we	 represent	 to	 ourselves	 the	justiYicatory	relationship	between	the	source	of	our	belief	and	the	belief	itself.	This	is	not	to	say	that	our	beliefs	are	exclusively	justiYied	in	this	way.	Not	all	of	our	beliefs	are	such	that	they	could	be	appropriately	 justiYied	 through	recollection,	nor	 is	 recollection	 the	only	way	 to	 justify	even	those	 beliefs	 that	 are	 of	 this	 kind.	 Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 a	 large	 range	 of	 beliefs	 for	 which	knowing	that	one	remembers	is	a	good	reason	to	hold	them.		
3.1.1.	Remembering	as	a	reason	for	others	But	how	could	 the	 fact	 that	one	remembers	serve	as	a	 reason	 for	others	 to	believe	a	given	assertion?	 Note	 that,	 in	 cases	 where	 minimal	 mutual	 trust	 between	 interlocutors	 can	 be	assumed,	it	is	indeed	the	case	that	‘remembering’	is	generally	taken	by	others	to	be	a	reason	for	accepting	certain	claims.	Consider	the	following	situation:	 John	and	Jenny	are	on	a	walk	when	Jenny	expresses	that	she	is	worried	that	they	might	have	left	on	the	oven	at	home.	To	this	John	replies	 “Don’t	worry,	 I	 remember	 that	we	 turned	 it	 off.”	Why	 should	 the	 statement	 that	 John	remembers	here	be	any	more	reassuring	 than	simply	stating:	 “Don’t	worry,	we	 turned	 it	off”?	Here,	“I	remember”	serves	as	a	reason	for	Jenny	to	accept	John’s	statement	just	as	it	serves	as	a	reason	for	John	to	indeed	believe	that	the	oven	was	turned	off.		Now,	clearly	remembering	does	not	work	as	a	reason	here	in	the	same	way	as	an	argument	does.	Instead,	we	can	get	a	clearer	sense	of	the	work	such	autonoetic	claims	do	in	interlocution	by	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 pragmatic	 structure	 of	 testimony.	 Testimony	 entitles	 an	interlocutor	 to	 take	whatever	 is	conveyed	as	 true	on	 the	authority	of	 the	speaker.	This	entails	that	by	giving	testimony,	the	speaker	herself	has	to	take	responsibility	for	the	truth	of	whatever	is	stated	(McMyler,	2007;	Turri,	2011).	In	the	case	of	‘second-hand’	testimony	one	can	defer	this	responsibility,	 but	 only	 in	 so	 far	 as	 one	 can	 actually	 access	 the	 source	 of	 the	 information	 in	question.		Indeed,	Nagel	(2015)	has	recently	argued	that	our	propensity	to	represent	the	ways	in	which	our	 epistemic	 states	 are	 grounded	 through	 source	 monitoring	 relates	 exactly	 to	 this	circumstance.	 She	 observes	 that	 the	 different	 sources	 of	 belief	 we	 intuitively	 take	 to	 hold	epistemic	 warrant	 do	 not	 regularly	 coincide	 with	 actual	 differences	 in	 reliability:	 an	 expert	judgment	received	through	testimony,	 for	example,	might	well	be	more	reliable	than	what	one	has	 concluded	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 one’s	 own	 perception.	 It	 thus	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 source	monitoring	 would	 serve	 a	 purely	 epistemic	 function.	 Instead,	 Nagel	 observes,	 “[s]ource	monitoring	matters	when	we	need	 to	 communicate	 our	 judgments	 to	 others:	 indeed,	 even	 to	decide	what	does	and	does	not	need	to	be	conveyed,	it	matters	where	our	judgments	are	coming	from,	and	where	our	evidence	 is	 situated,	 relative	 to	ourselves	and	our	audience”	 (p.	301).	 In	fact,	the	ubiquity	with	which	source	information	is	useful	in	communication	has	arguably	led	to	its	 grammaticalization	 in	 about	 one	 quarter	 of	 all	 known	 languages	 as	 evidential	 markers	(Aikhenvald,	2004;	Spears,	2008).	The	distinction	between	indirect	and	direct	forms	of	evidence	seems	to	be	common	to	all	evidential	systems.		
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This	begins	to	makes	sense	of	why	episodic	recollection	comes	with	a	representation	of	 its	own	origin.	On	this	view,	autonoesis	is	the	capacity	enabling	us	to	distinguish	between	cases	in	which	we	can	assert	epistemic	authority	for	our	own	testimony	and	cases	in	which	we	cannot.	Note	that	even	in	cases	where	one	defers	responsibility	to	someone	else,	one	will	have	to	take	responsibility	for	the	very	act	of	doing	so.	If	Hanna	tells	you,	“Mary	told	me	that	Mark	was	not	at	the	party	yesterday,”	while	Hanna	does	not	take	epistemic	responsibility	for	whether	Mark	was	indeed	at	said	party,	she	does	take	responsibility	for	the	fact	that	Mary	told	her	that	he	was	not.	A	 similar	 analysis	 applies	 to	 other	 types	 of	 sources	 for	 our	 beliefs,	which	 are	made	 available	through	the	source	component	of	episodic	memory	(seeing,	being	told,	inference,	etc.).	One	 reason	 for	 why	 it	 is	 important	 to	 monitor	 which	 assertions	 we	 can	 commit	 to	 in	discourse	is	reputational.	If	we	discursively	commit	to,	and	thereby	allow	others	to	rely	on,	the	truth	of	an	assertion,	we	 take	responsibility	 for	 its	 truth,	and	 thereby	put	our	 reputation	as	a	reliable	 informant	 on	 the	 line.	 Thus,	 discursive	 commitment	 comes	 at	 a	 potential	 (direct	 or	reputational)	cost	 in	case	our	message	is	 found	to	be	unreliable.	For	our	 interlocutors	the	fact	that	 we	 are	 willing	 to	 incur	 such	 a	 cost	 is	 a	 reason	 to	 believe	 us.	 Through	 this	 dynamic,	 as	Vullioud	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 have	 recently	 argued,	 discursive	 commitment	 is	 a	 way	 to	 stabilize	communication.	Claims	to	remembering	then	do	not	offer	a	way	of	overcoming	skepticism	in	the	same	 way	 as	 argumentation	 proper	 does. 	 Instead,	 it	 is	 an	 issue	 of	 competence:	 episodic	12memory	 allows	 us	 to	 signal	 to	 others	 that	 we	 indeed	 have	 epistemic	 authority	 on	 a	 certain	matter,	which	in	turn	commits	us	to	our	message	and	this	should	cause	others	to	believe	us.	In	fact,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	else	one	would	‘argue’	about	certain	past	events.	When	it	comes	to	 the	past,	 sometimes	epistemic	authority	 is	 all	we	have	 to	go	on	 in	order	 to	decide	what	 to	believe.	 Indeed,	 young	 children	 preferentially	 endorse	 the	 testimony	 of	 informants	 who	 had	Yirst-hand	 informational	 access	 (Terrier	 et	 al.,	 2016),	 and	 Castelain	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 showed	 that	young	 Maya	 children	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 endorse	 the	 testimony	 of	 a	 source	 claiming	 to	 have	epistemic	authority	 (“The	hen	went	 this	way	because	 I	have	 seen	 it”)	over	a	 source	giving	no	reason	even	when	it	conYlicted	with	another	cue	usually	governing	such	endorsement	(power).	Of	course,	episodic	memory	is	not	the	only	device	allowing	us	to	regulate	our	communicative	commitments.	Markers	of	 conYidence	 seem	 to	be	another	one	 (Vullioud	et	 al.,	 2016).	Episodic	memory	 is	 simply	 the	 mechanism	 speciYically	 geared	 towards	 regulating	 communicative	negotiation	about	past	events.	Therefore,	communicatively	negotiating	the	past	often	becomes	a	matter	 of	 convincing	 one’s	 interlocutor	 that	 one	 remembers;	 that	 is,	 that	 one	 has	 epistemic	authority	on	the	matter	in	question.	Because	remembering	is	such	an	effective	way	of	asserting	epistemic	authority,	 it	might	be	beneYicial	 to	attribute	the	origins	of	(at	 least	certain	types	of)	event	information	to	our	own	experience	in	situations	in	which	this	would	be	communicatively	useful.	This	might	explain	some	occurrences	of	the	famous	misinformation	effect	(Loftus,	2005).	Here,	witnesses	have	been	found	to	persistently	over-attribute	misleading	information	acquired	about	 an	 event	 after	 its	 occurrence	 (post-event	 misinformation)	 to	 their	 experience	 of	 this	event.	From	the	perspective	proposed	here,	 this	might	simply	be	 the	best	way	 to	make	use	of	this	 information	 in	 appearing	 as	 a	 good	witness.	 After	 all,	 if	 the	 participants	 in	 these	 studies	believe	the	misinformation	to	be	correct	(as	they	seem	to	do),	they	must	have	experienced	the	event	in	this	manner,	too.	Going	 further,	 this	 analysis	 also	 reveals	 a	 functional	 aspect	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 episodic	recollections	 are	 often	 rich	 in	 contextual	 details.	 While	 event	 memory	 should	 similarly	 be	characterized	 by	 the	 availability	 of	 contextual	 details,	 these	 details	 play	 a	 functional	 role	 for	communicative	purposes	in	episodic	memory.	When	we	debate	a	past	event,	the	fact	that	we	can	produce	rich,	detailed	descriptions	serves	as	evidence	for	others	to	believe	that	we	are	indeed	remembering	(Bell	&	Loftus,	1988,	1989),	as	it	does	for	ourselves,	too	(Johnson	&	Raye,	1981).	The	reason	for	this	might	be	that	contextual	details	(1)	give	one’s	interlocutor	more	leverage	to	detect	 potential	 inconsistencies	 and	 reduce	 vagueness	 (Kraut,	 1978),	 as	 well	 as	 (2)	 supply	information	 that	might	 potentially	 be	 independently	 veriYied.	 For	 example,	 information	 about	the	location	and	co-witnesses	of	an	event	makes	it	possible	to	potentially	obtain	evidence	about	the	 event	 that	 is	 not	 dependent	 on	 the	 testimony	 of	 one’s	 immediate	 interlocutor.	 Such	independent	veriYication	will	 in	practice	often	not	be	 carried	out.	 Instead,	 it	might	be	enough	
	 To	 be	 sure,	we	 frequently	 rely	 on	 epistemic	 authority	 in	 argumentation.	 Nonetheless,	 the	mechanism	 by	which	12claims	to	authority	and	arguments	try	to	change	others’	minds	differ.
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that	an	interlocutor	is	willing	to	make	her	account	subject	to	such	veriYication,	which	is	taken	as	a	 reason	 to	 accept	 her	 testimony.	 Consequentially,	 contextual	 elements	 which,	 at	 least	potentially,	 make	 veriYication	 possible	might	 be	more	 readily	 available	 in	 recollection	 simply	because	this	information	should	allow	one	to	be	perceived	as	more	convincing.	When	we	argue	about	the	past,	we	often	do	not	contest	whether	the	event	 in	question	happened	but	rather	in	what	way	 it	 did,	 and	having	 access	 to	 contextual	 details	 is	 often	 crucial	 to	 establish	which	 of	multiple	accounts	of	an	event	should	be	endorsed	and	what	it	should	be	taken	to	entail.		
3.1.2.	The	consequences	of	discursive	commitment	Another	prediction	following	from	this	account	concerns	the	fact	that	once	one	has	publicly	committed	to,	and	therefore	taken	epistemic	responsibility	for,	the	truth	of	a	certain	version	of	events	 through	 testimony,	 this	 should	 have	 subsequent	 consequences	 on	 how	 and	 what	 one	remembers.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 after	 testimony,	 it	 becomes	 less	 important	 to	 recall	 the	 actual	event.	 Instead,	 in	 order	 to	 uphold	 one’s	 commitment,	 maximize	 believability,	 and	 avoid	reputational	damage	through	inconsistency,	one	should	stick	to	one’s	own	account	to	a	certain	extent.	In	cases	where	one’s	account	of	an	event	and	the	actual	happenings	diverge,	one	might	thus	subsequently	remember	the	event	in	question	in	a	way	that	supports	one’s	report.	A	range	of	memory	distortion	effects	occurring	as	a	consequence	of	memory	report	suggests	that	this	is	indeed	 what	 happens.	 For	 example,	 Cochran	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 investigated	 the	 effect	 of	 altering	participants’	memory	reports	on	 their	memory	 for	crime	events.	They	 found	 that	participants	often	did	not	detect	 the	changes	 to	 their	reports	and	 instead	altered	their	memories	 to	 Yit	 the	manipulated	reports.	Tversky	and	Marsh	(2000)	found	that	the	public	stance	one	takes	on	a	past	event	biases	recall	to	emphasize	details	supporting	one’s	claim	(see	Higgins	&	Rholes,	1978,	and	Greene,	 1981	 for	 related	 effects).	 This	 stance,	 in	 turn,	 has	 been	 found	 to	 depend	 on	 one’s	particular	 audience	 (arguably	 serving	 both	 reputation	 management	 and	 making	 one’s	 own	memory	 report	 easier	 to	 accept	 for	 others),	 further	 altering	memory	 (Echterhoff	 et	 al.,	 2008;	2009;	Kopietz	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Pasupathi,	 1998).	 In	 effect,	 after	 having	 reported	 an	 event,	 people	subsequently	 do	 not	 recall	 the	 original	 event	 but	 rather	 a	 version	 in	 line	 with	 their	 latest	retelling	of	it	(Marsh,	2007).		The	extent	to	which	such	distortions	would	be	communicatively	useful	should	be	constrained	by	how	skeptical	and	informed	one’s	audience	is.	People	should	be	sensitive	to	the	costs	of	being	found	wrong,	and	appropriately	adjust	the	extent	to	which	they	prioritize	consistency	with	their	own	account	over	accuracy.	Thus,	 the	distorting	effects	of	giving	testimony	might	be	mediated	by	 how	 skeptical	 and	 informed	 one	 perceives	 one’s	 audience	 to	 be.	 To	 our	 knowledge,	 this	prediction	has	not	been	tested.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 commitment	 to	 one’s	 testimony	 should	 cause	 one	 to	 be	 less	 easily	convinced	of	a	different	version	of	occurrences	since	this	would	undermine	one’s	own	epistemic	authority.	 Indeed,	 participants’	 susceptibility	 to	 social	 inYluence	has	been	 found	 to	depend	on	whether	they	had	committed	in	one	way	or	another	to	certain	details	of	an	event	(Bregman	&	McAllister,	1982;	Loftus,	1977;	Schooler,	Foster,	&	Loftus,	1988).	The	reason	for	this	cannot	be	simply	epistemic	since	in	general	participants	have	been	shown	to	be	quite	ready	to	update	their	memories	on	 the	basis	of	others’	 testimony.	 Instead,	our	account	suggests	 that	participants	 in	these	studies	became	resistant	to	social	inYluence	in	order	to	ensure	their	own	believability.	
3.1.3.	Recollective	myside	bias	Being	able	to	convince	others	that	we	are	indeed	remembering	is	only	important	in	so	far	as	it	helps	us	to	convince	them	about	what	we	are	remembering.	The	contents	of	our	memories	are	crucial	 for	 supporting	 certain	 conclusions	 over	 others	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 interpretation	 of	what	a	given	event	entails.	Thus,	if	episodic	memory	indeed	has	the	communicative	function	of	appropriately	asserting	epistemic	authority	about	the	past,	we	should	expect	it	to	make	content	available	in	a	way	that	supports	our	claims.	Mercier	 and	 Sperber	 (2011)	have	 argued	 that	 because	 the	production	of	 reasons	does	not	serve	normative	epistemic	goals	but	to	convince	others,	it	should	primarily	Yind	reasons	in	favor	of	whatever	we	want	to	claim.	Their	view	predicts	the	well-known	myside	bias	in	reasoning:	the	human	 tendency	 to	 reason	 from	 conclusions	 to	 premises	 and	 not	 vice	 versa	 as	 normatively	required.	By	analogy,	when	we	claim	that	episodic	memory	is	crucial	for	persuading	others	of	a	particular	version	of	the	past,	we	should	similarly	expect	such	a	bias	in	remembering:	in	order	
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to	be	able	to	‘argue’	for	our	beliefs	about	a	past	event,	our	recollections	should	tend	to	support	those	beliefs	instead	of	contradicting	them.	Indeed,	such	a	‘recollective	myside	bias’	is	instantiated	through	the	way	in	which	our	beliefs	guide	 the	 construction	 of	memory	 content.	 Similarly	 to	 conYirmatory	 reasoning,	 belief-guided	memory	construction	(reviewed	in	Section	1.2.2)	can	be	taken	to	be	a	version	of	the	myside	bias	to	 the	 extent	 that	 one	 constructs	 a	 memory	 justifying	 what	 one	 already	 believes	 to	 have	happened.	 Understanding	 memory	 re-construction	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 myside	 bias	 for	 the	purposes	of	persuasion	can	make	sense	of	the	surprising	interplay	between	beliefs	and	memory	content:	 the	 constructive	 process	 tends	 to	 retrospectively	 create	 memories	 conYirming	 and	supporting	held	beliefs	and	attitudes.	From	this	perspective,	such	false	memories	are	simply	the	results	of	an	inherent	tendency	to	justify	our	beliefs	about	the	past	to	ourselves	in	order	to	be	able	to	justify	them	towards	others;	they	illustrate	a	functional	feature,	rather	than	a	bug	in,	the	mechanisms	 of	 episodic	 memory.	 Thus,	 inducing	 beliefs	 about	 the	 past	 in	 participants	 is	followed	by	false	memories	because	once	we	have	accepted	a	piece	of	information,	justiYiability	is	ensured	through	the	construction	of	supporting	memory	content.		Of	course,	if	we	are	correct,	there	should	be	limits	to	this	form	of	my-side	bias.	If	the	costs	of	being	 found	 wrong	 are	 high,	 or	 our	 audience	 can	 monitor	 our	 assertions	 effectively,	 we	ourselves	should	be	more	 ‘skeptical’	towards	the	outputs	of	our	own	construction	system	(i.e.,	spend	more	 efforts	 on	 checking	 their	 consistency),	 and	 consequently	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 form	 a	false	memory.		
3.1.4.	Selective	remembering	and	motivated	forgetting	A	similar	analysis	can	be	applied	to	phenomena	described	under	the	heading	of	 ‘motivated	forgetting’	 (Anderson	&	Hanslmayr,	 2014).	Motivated	 forgetting	describes	 a	process	by	which	selective	or	inhibited	retrieval	leads	to	forgetting	of	aspects	of	(or	entire)	events.	People	tend	to	selectively	remember	arguments	in	favor	of	an	endorsed	conclusion	or	attitude	while	forgetting	counter-arguments	to	the	same	conclusion	(Waldum	&	Sahakyan,	2012).	This	process	has	been	shown	 to	be	especially	prevalent	 in	 the	domain	of	moral	 violations.	 In	 fact,	memories	of	own	moral	violations	are	more	likely	to	be	forgotten	than	memories	of	own	moral	behavior,	so	that	people	sometimes	seem	to	display	a	form	of	‘unethical	amnesia’	of	their	past	(Kouchaki	&	Gino,	2016).	In	contrast,	Bell,	Schain,	and	Echterhoff	(2014)	have	shown	that	memory	for	the	cheating	behavior	 of	 others	 is	 well	 remembered	 when	 it	 is	 associated	 with	 personal	 costs	 but	 easily	forgotten	when	associated	with	personal	beneYits.	These	processes	lead	to	the	phenomenon	of	‘rose-colored’	memories,	which	emphasize	one’s	own	moral	character.	Given	the	importance	of	episodic	memory	for	the	communicative	negotiation	of	the	past,	such	effects	are	not	surprising.	Both	on	the	 individual	 (Kappes	&	Crocket,	2016),	as	well	on	the	collective	 level	 (Coman	et	al.,	2014),	selective	remembering	and	motivated	forgetting	serve	communicative	ends:	convincing	oneself	simply	helps	to	convince	others	(von	Hippel	&	Trivers,	2011).		
3.1.5.	Remembering	reasons	As	we	noted	 in	Section	1.1.2,	 taking	 remembering	 to	be	an	attitude	makes	 intelligible	how	one	can	remember	imagining,	believing,	wanting,	etc.	On	our	view	this	makes	sense	in	so	far	as	the	 process	 of	 retrieving	 reasons	 via	 ‘introspection’	 in	many	 cases	 amounts	 to	 an	 attempt	 at	remembering	 these	reasons.	To	see	 this,	 consider	 Johansson	et	al.’s	 (2005;	 for	a	higher	stakes	example	 see	Hall,	 Johansson,	&	 Strandberg,	 2012)	 famous	 choice	 blindness	 experiments.	 In	 a	series	 of	 two-alternative	 forced-choice	 trials,	 participants	were	 asked	 to	 choose	 between	 two	faces	 the	 one	 they	 found	more	 attractive.	 After	 answering,	 participants	were	 presented	 again	with	the	chosen	face	and	asked	to	explain	why	they	had	chosen	this	face.	Crucially,	in	a	certain	proportion	of	trials,	the	experimenter	switched	the	presented	face	by	sleight	of	hand	so	that	the	participant	was	now	presented	with	the	face	they	had	not	chosen.	In	this	situation,	not	only	did	a	substantial	number	of	participants	not	notice	the	change,	they	went	on	to	give	reasons	for	why	they	ostensibly	had	chosen	the	face	presented	to	them.	How	did	the	participants	come	up	with	reasons	 for	 a	 choice	 they	had	not	made	 in	 this	 situation?	Clearly,	 they	must	have	 constructed	these	 reasons	on	 the	 Yly	 in	 response	 to	being	 asked	 to	 justify	 their	 choice.	 Crucially,	 however,	since	the	participants	did	not	notice	that	they	were	justifying	a	choice	they	had	not	made,	they	presumably	believed	that	the	reasons	they	gave	were	actually	the	reasons	that	had	guided	their	(imagined)	 original	 choice.	 The	 only	way,	 however,	 this	 is	 possible	 is	 if	 participants	 sincerely	
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took	 themselves	 to	 remember	 these	 reasons.	 This	 kind	of	 post-hoc	 generation	of	memories	 is	often	required	when	we	genuinely	give	reasons	for	our	behavior	after	the	fact.	In	this	way,	the	attitude	of	remembering	is	crucial	to	introspecting	our	own	past	reasons.	
3.1.6.	Source	monitoring	as	self-directed	epistemic	vigilance	As	 mentioned	 above,	 epistemic	 vigilance	 and	 the	 mechanisms	 designed	 to	 disarm	 such	vigilance	 are	 essentially	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin.	 The	 easiest	 and	 most	 effective	 way	 to	anticipate	one’s	 interlocutor’s	 vigilance	might	be	 to	 exercise	 such	vigilance	 against	 one’s	 own	assertions	 before	 uttering	 them.	 Source	 monitoring,	 as	 described	 by	 Johnson	 et	 al.	 (1993),	displays	 just	 such	 a	 structure.	 Michaelian	 (2012a;	 2012b)	 noted	 that	 source	 monitoring	mechanisms	 are	 endorsement	 devices:	 they	 decide	 to	 what	 extent	 we	 should	 believe	 the	contents	of	our	own	recollections	by	scrutinizing	them	for	their	believability,	just	as,	and	to	the	extent	 to	 which,	 others	 do	 when	 they	 hear	 our	 testimony.	 These	 endorsement	 mechanisms	might	then	be	one	way	in	which	we	can	gauge	whether	we	should	indeed	commit	to	a	certain	claim	 about	 the	 past	 or	 not.	 While	 Johnson	 and	 colleagues	 seem	 to	 assume	 that	 source	monitoring	is	purely	epistemic	in	function	and	compulsory	in	event	recall,	it	might	well	be	that	these	processes	are	only	applied	in	situations	in	which	scrutiny	is	required:	situations	in	which	one	expects	to	face	a	(skeptical)	audience. 	13
3.2.	Supporting	epistemic	vigilance		Source	 monitoring	 does	 not	 just	 serve	 anticipating	 others'	 vigilance	 but	 also	 functions	 to	exercise	vigilance	against	others.	This	is	borne	out	by	the	fact	that	children	become	increasingly	less	suggestible	as	a	 result	of	 source	memory	development	 (Lampinen	&	Smith,	1995;	Bright-Paul,	 Jarrold,	&	Wright,	2005;	Giles,	Gopnik,	&	Heyman,	2002).	Having	access	to	the	sources	of	our	beliefs	allows	us	to	keep	track	of	the	sources	of	transmitted	information	and	scrutinize	such	sources	for	their	competence	and	intentions.			
3.2.1.	Source-directed	epistemic	vigilance	Similarly	to	our	account,	Cosmides,	Tooby,	and	colleagues	(Cosmides	&	Tooby,	2000;	Klein	et	al.,	 2002;	 2009;	 see	 also	 Boyer,	 2009)	 emphasize	 the	 role	 of	 episodic	 memory	 in	 epistemic	vigilance.	On	their	view,	the	fact	that	humans	so	excessively	rely	on	communicated	information	has	necessitated	a	mechanism	allowing	us	to	adjust	the	truth-value	of	our	beliefs	according	to	their	 source.	 In	 order	 to	 decide	 whether	 an	 interlocutor	 is	 trustworthy,	 or	 whether	 to	 re-evaluate	 such	 trust,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 have	 access	 to	 her	 past	 behavior	 in	 speciYic	 situations.	When	we	learn	new	information	about	an	interlocutor’s	reliability	after	the	fact,	it	is	important	to	 have	 access	 to	 our	 interaction	 history	 with	 this	 speciYic	 person	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 re-evaluate	any	pieces	of	information	we	might	have	received	from	her.	The	importance	of	source	monitoring	in	such	situations	is	showcased	in	misinformation	studies,	in	which	participants	are	able	 to	 recover	 their	 original	 event	 representation	 when	 they	 are	 informed	 of	 the	 deceptive	character	 of	 the	 misinformation	 (Blank	 &	 Launay,	 2014;	 Echeterhoff	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Oeberst	 &	Blank,	 2012).	 However,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 mediocre	 effectiveness	 of	 most	 ‘post-warnings,’	episodic	memory	seems	to	be	rarely	used	in	this	way.	Most	of	the	time	when	we	are	informed	that	a	given	source	is	untrustworthy	we	merely	discount	this	source	in	the	future.	Nonetheless,	as	predicted	by	our	account,	encoding	is	mediated	by	epistemic	vigilance	towards	the	source	of	information:	 misinformation	 and	 conformity	 effects	 are	 not	 automatic	 but	 rather	 depend	 on	participants’	 evaluation	 of	 their	 own	 conYidence	 and	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 source	 of	 the	presented	information	(Allan	et	al.,	2012;	French	et	al.,	2011;	Gabbert,	Memon,	&	Wright,	2007;	Jaeger	et	al.,	2012;	Lindsay	&	Johnson,	1989).	When	participants	have	reason	to	doubt	their	own	(AseYi	 &	 Garry,	 2003;	 ClifaseYi	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 or	 others’	 ability	 (Kwong	 See,	Wood,	 &	 Hoffman,	2001)	or	trustworthiness	(Dodd	&	Bradshaw,	1980),	they	refrain	from	memory	update.	In	such	cases,	 rather	 than	 simply	 updating	 their	 own	 event	 representations	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 others’	testimony,	participants	encode	it	in	a	separate	trace	(Ludmer,	Edelson,	&	Dudai,	2015).		
	In	fact,	from	our	perspective,	the	term	‘source	monitoring’	is	slightly	misleading	because	what	these	mechanisms	13monitor	 is	not	 the	 source	of	 our	memories	but	 their	believability.	While	 the	outcome	of	 this	process	might	be	 the	ascription	of	a	source,	it	does	not	‘monitor’	sources.	
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3.2.2.	Interpersonal	reality	monitoring	The	 two-sided	 nature	 of	 vigilance	 and	 counter-vigilance	 is	 illustrated	 in	 another	 aspect	 of	recollection.	In	deciding	whether	someone	is	telling	the	truth	in	recounting	the	past,	we	usually	try	 to	 determine	whether	 our	 interlocutor	 is	 remembering	 or	making	 up	 the	 contents	 of	 her	testimony.	Research	in	the	tradition	of	the	source	monitoring	framework	has	investigated	how	we	 make	 this	 decision	 about	 ourselves	 through	 so-called	 ‘reality	 monitoring’	 mechanisms	(Johnson	&	Raye,	1988;	Johnson,	1991).		Apart	 from	 allowing	 us	 to	 determine	 whether	 we	 should	 take	 ourselves	 to	 be	 actually	remembering,	 reality	monitoring	 could	 play	 a	 role	 in	making	 this	 decision	 about	 others,	 too.	That	is,	 in	order	to	decide	whether	we	are	remembering	or	imagining	a	given	event,	we	might	utilize	 the	 same	 mechanisms	 that	 are	 charged	 with	 this	 decision	 when	 evaluating	 others’	testimony.	This	is	suggested	to	some	degree	by	studies	on	‘interpersonal	reality	monitoring’	—	the	ability	to	judge	whether	other	people’s	memories	reYlect	real	or	imagined	events	(Johnson,	Bush,	&	Mitchell,	1998;	Johnson	&	Suengas,	1989).	These	studies	suggest	that	participants	use	the	same	criteria	to	evaluate	their	own	memory	content	and	others’	memory	accounts,	and	can	display	 above	 chance	 discrimination	 performance	 in	 such	 situations	 (Clark-Foos,	 Brewer,	 &	Marsh,	2015).	Note,	however,	that	this	is	not	a	matter	of	detecting	outright	deception	but	rather	one	 of	 deciding	 whether	 we	 should	 grant	 our	 interlocutor	 epistemic	 authority.	 In	 detecting	deception,	we	likely	use	other	mechanisms	to	assess	others’	intentions,	which	then	in	turn	might	inYluence	our	reality	monitoring	decisions.		
3.2.3.	Veridical	recollection	and	epistemic	vigilance	Viewing	episodic	memory	as	striking	a	balance	between	the	productive	and	receptive	sides	of	communication	can	make	sense	of	the	confusing	interplay	between	veridicality	and	malleability	described	 in	 Section	 1.2.2.	 Similar	 to	 reasoning	 (Mercier	 &	 Sperber,	 2011),	 the	 evolution	 of	episodic	 memory	 systems	 should	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 an	 ‘arms	 race’	 between	 senders	 and	receivers	 of	 communicated	 information	 about	 past	 events.	While	 senders	 have	 an	 interest	 in	inducing	 in	 their	 audience	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 past	 that	 is	 to	 their	 beneYit,	 receivers	 are	interested	 in	 acquiring	 useful	 (i.e.,	 true)	 information.	 Thus,	 the	 better	 senders	 should	 be	 at	manipulating	 their	 audience’s	beliefs	 about	 the	past	 to	 their	own	beneYit,	 the	better	 receivers	should	 be	 at	 discerning	 true	 from	 misleading	 information.	 Both	 sides	 of	 this	 interaction	therefore	require	the	capacity	to	represent	the	past	accurately.	On	the	one	hand,	speakers	should	be	sensitive	to	how	informed	and	skeptical	their	audience	is	 and	 consequently	 be	 more	 careful	 about	 what	 they	 commit	 to	 (i.e.,	 exert	 more	 effort	 in	checking	 their	 own	 memory	 representation	 for	 its	 believability).	 In	 other	 words,	 if	 episodic	memory	were	never	true	it	would	not	convince	anyone. 	Receivers,	on	the	other	hand,	should	14be	sensitive	to	their	interlocutor’s	intentions	and	(if	available)	spend	more	cognitive	resources	to	monitor	the	believability	of	her	utterances.	Thus,	 the	 epistemic	 vigilance	 functions	 of	 episodic	 memory	 coincide	 with	 the	 ‘epistemic	route’	 from	memory	 content	 to	 belief:	We	 are	 able	 to	 form	 and	 revise	 beliefs	 on	 the	 basis	 of	episodic	 recollection	 because	 this	 enables	 us	 to	 guard	 against	 others’	 incompetence	 and	deceptive	intent	in	communicative	interaction.	This	perspective	then	gives	us	an	explanation	for	why	(and	when)	we	should	expect	episodic	memory	to	be	veridical:	epistemic	vigilance	requires	sensitivity	to	the	actual	past	so	as	to	be	able	to	review	others’	claims	and	decide	when	to	revise	our	own	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	such	claims.	Moreover,	the	fact	that	we	can	expect	others	to	be	vigilant,	and	as	such	sensitive	to	the	truth,	should	force	us	to	stick	to	actual	events	to	the	extent	that	 others	 can	 monitor	 us	 in	 communicative	 interaction.	 Thus,	 the	 construction	 process	 in	episodic	memory	 should	 be	 sensitive	 to	 the	 communicative	 situation	we	 Yind	 ourselves	 in.	 In	cases	in	which	we	face	a	skeptical	audience,	which	raises	the	costs	of	being	found	unreliable,	or	when	we	are	scrutinizing	someone	else’s	claims	on	the	basis	of	our	own	memory,	construction	should	aim	at	accurate	event	representation.		
3.3.	Episodic	memory	format	explained	Taking	 a	 perspective	 from	 human	 communication	 on	 episodic	 memory	 can	 illuminate	 its	
	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 there	 are	 no	 other	 reasons	why	 event	memory	 requires	 veridicality.	14Since	we	are	not	concerned	with	event	memory	here,	however,	we	will	not	discuss	this	issue.
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format	in	a	functional	light.	Here	we	summarize	the	above	discussion	in	terms	of	how	we	have	made	sense	of	the	features	pertaining	to	the	format	of	episodic	memory	identiYied	in	Section	1.3.	- Epistemic	generativity	allows	us	to	(meta-)represent	the	reasons	for	our	beliefs	about	past	events	so	as	to	give	these	reasons	in	testimony.	- Autonoesis	 delineates	 for	 which	 of	 our	 claims	 about	 the	 past	 we	 can	 assert	 epistemic	authority.	Beyond	 the	 above	 features	 that	 discriminate	 episodic	 memory	 from	 event	 memory,	 our	analysis	also	account	 for	why	episodic	memory	 is	both	congruency	prone	(risking	 to	be	 false)	and	 aiming	 at	 veridicality	 simultaneously.	 The	 fact	 that	 scenario	 construction	 is	 congruency	prone	 allows	 us	 to	 effectively	 ‘argue’	 for	 those	 beliefs	we	 already	 hold.	 Nonetheless,	 episodic	memory	 is	 commonly	veridical	because	 it	 serves	a	 role	 in	epistemic	vigilance,	which	 requires	some	degree	of	sensitivity	to	actual	occurrences.		
3.4.	Past	events	as	reasons	Our	 account	 so	 far	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 structural	 features	 of	 episodic	 memory.	 But	 what	arguably	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 an	 explanation	 of	 episodic	 memory	 function	 is	 not	 only	 its	metarepresentational	 nature.	 After	 all,	 these	 are	 aspects	 shared	 with	 many	 other	 aspects	 of	cognition	 supporting	 human	 communication	 (Mercier	 &	 Sperber,	 forthcoming).	 What	 makes	these	 features	 interesting	 is	 rather	 the	 content	 to	 which	 they	 pertain	 in	 episodic	 memory:	speciYic	 past	 events.	 The	question	 that	we	have	 yet	 to	 answer	 is	why	 such	 a	 representational	structure	should	be	necessary	for	this	content	in	particular.	Why	did	humans	develop	a	speciYic	mechanism	regulating	their	communicative	commitment	about	past	events?	Why	would	we	ever	want	to	convince	others	about	a	particular	version	of	history,	and	why	do	we	care	what	others	assert	 about	 the	details	of	 events	 they	experienced	 in	 the	past?	While	 a	 full	 treatment	of	 this	question	would	exceed	the	boundaries	of	the	current	article,	we	provide	here	a	short	attempt	at	one	potential	answer,	without	claiming	that	it	exhaustively	accounts	for	all	examples	of	humans'	obsession	with	the	past.	
3.4.1.	Remembering	events	generating	social	commitments	Because	 knowledge	 about	 speciYic	 events	 can	 be	 critical	 in	 assessing	 the	 truth	 of	 certain	generalizations,	their	recollection	can	also	be	crucial	in	supporting	the	communicative	assertion	of	many	such	generalizations	(“I	remember	seeing	him	beating	his	wife,	therefore	he	must	be	an	aggressive	 person”).	 In	 principle,	 any	 inductively	 derived	 conclusion	 can	 be	 supported	 or	undermined	 by	 pointing	 to	 speciYic	 events.	 Nonetheless,	 reference	 to	 past	 events	 is	 not	mandatory	 in	 arguing	 for	 inductive	 generalizations.	 In	 principle	 one	 can	 argue	 for	 such	assertions	by	pointing	to	other	generalizations	one	holds	true	as	well.		There	are	however,	certain	claims	for	which	it	is	impossible	to	argue	except	by	reference	to	speciYic	past	events;	namely	the	assertion	of	social	commitments.	Examples	of	such	events	are	agreements	 between	 multiple	 parties	 that	 commit	 one	 or	 the	 other	 interactant	 to	 a	 certain	behavior	 in	 the	 future	 (Schelling,	 1960).	 But	 these	 are	 by	 no	 means	 the	 only	 examples;	potentially	any	event	can	be	used	to	establish	social	commitments	or	entitlements	depending	on	what	interpretation	one	chooses	after	the	fact.	Indeed,	most	events	that	happen	to	us	on	a	daily	basis	are	heavily	loaded	with	social	meaning,	which	largely	depends	on	their	potential	to	ground	such	social	commitments.	And	this	potential	 is	 in	turn	realized	only	when	a	case	can	be	made	that	a	given	event	did	 indeed	occur	 in	a	speciYic	way	in	the	past.	 In	 fact,	sometimes	this	 is	 the	only	way	to	argue	for	many	present	entitlements.	The	 acts	 through	 which	 we	 engage	 in	 and	 negotiate	 our	 social	 commitments	 are	 causal	events:	 their	effect	 is	 the	establishment	of	a	social	 ‘fact.’	However,	 in	contrast	 to	causal	events	that	result	in	changes	in	the	physical	environment,	not	only	are	many	of	the	events	‘establishing’	such	social	commitments	(like	promises)	entirely	transient,	but	their	effects	are	dependent	on	a	social	 agreement,	which	 in	 turn	 is	 dependent	 on	what	 our	 conspeciYics	 believe.	The	 transient	nature	of	 these	 ‘social’	events	 is	problematic	both	because,	on	the	one	hand,	 their	committing	force	 is	 dependent	 on	 their	 continuous	 inYluence	 through	 time,	 while,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 by	themselves	 they	do	not	 leave	 any	physical	 traces	of	 the	 events	 in	question.	 If	 Susan	promises	Alan	to	meet	him	in	front	of	the	cinema	at	8pm,	she	is	obliged	to	be	there,	but	this	commitment	survives	(if	at	all)	only	in	the	mind	of	each	party	and	perhaps	of	the	witnesses	of	the	interaction.	
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In	principle,	nothing	but	a	reference	to	the	speciYic	occurrence	establishing	the	commitment	could	 be	 used	 to	 communicatively	 enforce	 the	 resultant	 obligations	 and	 entitlements.	 In	 fact,	this	 is	 arguably	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 why	 humans	 have	 culturally	 developed	 so	 many	‘commitment	 devices’:	 ways	 of	 making	 such	 arrangements	 either	 physically	 traceable	 in	 the	form	of	written	contracts	and	other	kinds	of	symbols,	or	making	the	commitment	public	so	that	it	 becomes	 impossible	 to	 deny	 one’s	 obligation	 without	 damaging	 one’s	 reputation	 with	everyone	 who	 co-witnessed	 the	 event	 in	 question.	 Short	 of,	 and	 often	 in	 spite	 of,	 such	commitment	 devices,	 however,	 nothing	 but	 one's	 memory	 of	 the	 interaction	 will	 be	 able	 to	advocate	whether	and	how	obligations	and	commitments	are	distributed.	If	Susan	does	not	turn	up	 in	 time	 in	 front	 of	 the	 cinema,	 invoking	Alan’s	memory	 of	 the	 interaction	with	 Susan	will	allow	him	 to	 confront	her	not	 just	by	 citing	 the	obligation	 that	 she	 failed	 to	meet	but	 also	by	justifying	his	belief	in	the	existence	of	this	obligation	by	referring	to	the	event	that	generated	it.	The	 ability	 to	 explicitly	 refer	 back	 to	 speciYic	 past	 events	 is	 therefore	 essential	 for	 the	argumentative	negotiation	of	present	obligations	and	entitlements.	
3.4.2.	Bookkeeping	or	remembering?	Social	commitments	have	evolutionary	signiYicance	because	they	make	it	possible	for	parties	in	an	exchange	to	gain	beneYits	 that	would	be	unattainable	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	risk	of	defection.	Such	 commitments	 become	 important	 in	 the	 large	 spectrum	 of	 social	 relations	 in	 which	 the	incentives	 of	 the	 involved	 parties	 are	 only	 partly	 aligned.	 As	 soon	 as	 incentives	 are	 entirely	aligned	or	entirely	misaligned,	there	is	no	room	for	such	commitments	to	be	effective	because,	in	the	 former	 case,	 trust	 is	 not	 required	 and,	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 trust	 is	 impossible.	 As	 Schelling	(1960)	 pointed	 out,	 such	 a	 situation	 of	 partly	 misaligned	 incentives	 characterizes	 the	 large	majority	of	our	social	interactions.	Thus,	social	commitments	dramatically	expand	the	range	of	possible	ways	of	cooperation.	In	principle,	in	order	to	make	social	commitments	effective,	all	that	is	cognitively	required	is	a	 mechanism	 that	 keeps	 track	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 who	 owes	 what	 to	 whom	 (Brosnan	 &	DeWaal,	2002;	Schino	&	Aureli,	2009;	2010).	Such	a	‘bookkeeping	mechanism’	does	not	need	to	consider	the	reasons	for	these	commitments	themselves.	Bookkeeping	allows	one	to	keep	track	of	and	appropriately	handle	one’s	own	and	others’	commitments.	It	also	allows	one	to	regulate	one’s	 trust	 towards	 others	 based	 on	 their	 willingness	 to	 reciprocate.	 Bookkeeping	 does	 not,	however,	 allow	 one	 to	 argue	 for,	 and	 by	 arguing	 to	 effectively	 enforce,	 negotiate	 or	 establish,	one’s	entitlements.	One	can	engage	in	various	behavioral	strategies	to	collect	what	one	is	owed	or	 to	 retaliate	 against	 defection.	 However,	 being	 able	 to	 justify	 and	 thereby	 convince	 others	about	 entitlements	 could	 avoid	 costly,	 and	 potentially	 escalating,	 physical	 conYlict.	 Thus,	episodic	memory,	by	enabling	reference	to	the	past	events	that	established	speciYic	entitlements,	could	serve	the	negotiation	of	cooperative	interactions	in	humans.		
3.4.3.	Episodic	memory	content	explained	These	considerations	then	might	provide	an	example	for	why	humans	should	have	developed	a	mechanism	regulating	communicative	interaction	about	speci@ic	events	in	the	past:	- Social	 commitments	 are	 often	 generated	 by	 singular	 events	 whose	 effects	 are	 solely	dependent	on	the	way	these	events	can	be	referred	back	to	by	the	parties	involved	or	by	their	witnesses.		- The	effects	of	 social	 commitments	always	 take	place	 in	 the	 future,	 and	 their	negotiation	therefore	will	necessarily	require	representing	them	as	having	occurred	in	the	past.	
4.	Conclusions	We	 have	 provided	 an	 attempt	 to	 explain	 human,	 mature	 episodic	 memory	 in	 functional	terms.	We	have	distinguished	episodic	memory	from	event	memory,	and	analyzed	it	as	playing	a	generative	role	in	the	justiYication	of	our	beliefs	about	past	events.	In	explaining	the	function	of	this	capacity,	we	have	followed	a	two-pronged	approach.		First,	 we	 have	 provided	 an	 account	 of	 the	 metarepresentational	 structure	 of	 episodic	memory	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 role	 in	 communicative	 interaction.	 According	 to	 this	 view,	 autonoesis	allows	us	to	determine	when	and	how	to	assert	epistemic	authority	in	negotiating	the	past.	 In	effect,	episodic	memory	allows	us	to	communicatively	support	our	 interpretations	of	 the	past.	
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This	 view	 can	make	 sense	 of	 a	 range	 of	 empirical	 evidence;	 most	 importantly,	 why	 episodic	memory	construction	has	the	tendency	to	conYirm	what	we	believe	about	the	past	and	why	it	is	nonetheless	commonly	veridical.		One	 consequence	 of	 this	 analysis	 is	 that	 episodic	 memory	 should	 be	 taken	 to	 be	 human	speciYic.	Other	accounts	arguing	for	this	conclusion	have	been	criticized	for	being	unfalsiYiable	because	 they	do	not	offer	behavioral	markers	 that	could	differentiate	between	autonoetic	and	non-autonoetic	 forms	of	 event	memory.	Our	 account	 identiYies	 a	 clear	 function	 for	 autonoetic	remembering	(the	negotiation	of	epistemic	authority),	which	other	animals,	in	the	absence	of	a	communication	medium	 capable	 of	 conveying	 justiYications,	 do	 not	 need	 to	 fulYill.	 Thus,	 from	our	perspective,	it	seems	unlikely	that	other	animals	(and	very	young	children)	would	have	the	capacity	for	entertaining	autonoetic	memories,	simply	because	they	do	not	need	it.	Another	consequence	of	our	account	is	therefore	that	the	capacity	for	episodic	memory	and	the	capacity	to	communicate	about	the	past	linguistically	should	be	importantly	connected	both	developmentally	 and	 constitutively.	 While	 we	 have	 not	 made	 any	 speciYic	 claims	 about	development,	there	is	at	least	correlational	evidence	from	developmental	psychology	suggesting	that	the	capacities	for	episodic	memory	and	communication	about	the	past	are	connected	(e.g.,	Nelson	&	 Fyvush,	 2004).	 Childhood	 amnesia	 is	 generally	 thought	 to	 end	 between	 the	 ages	 of	three	to	Yive	(Hayne	&	Jack,	2011),	the	same	time	when	children	begin	to	be	able	to	use	source	information	 productively	 (Gopnik	 &	 Graf,	 1988;	 Drummey	 &	 Newcombe,	 2002;	 Wimmer,	Hogrefe	&	Perner,	1988;	Whitcombe	&	Robinson,	2000)	and	start	to	display	epistemic	vigilance	(Clément,	 Koenig	 &	 Harris,	 2004;	 Mascaro	 &	 Sperber,	 2009;	 Koenig	 &	 Harris,	 2007).	 In	 fact,	infants	 (Bauer	 &	 Leventon,	 2013)	 and	 young	 children	 (Burns	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Király	 et	 al.,	 in	preparation;	Mullaly	&	Maguire,	2014)	can	recall	and	make	use	of	event	information,	suggesting	the	operation	of	constructive	processes	resulting	in	event	memories.	However,	only	after	the	age	of	 three	do	they	become	able	to	use	this	 information	as	source	 information	 in	communication	(Haigh	&	Robinson,	 2009).	 These	 correlations	 invite	 further	 investigations	 of	 the	 relationship	between	the	development	of	episodic	memory	and	communicative	expertise.	More	 generally,	 the	 account	 offered	 here	 is	 merely	 a	 functional	 one	 and	 does	 not	 make	precise	 predictions	 about	 the	 information	 processing	mechanisms	 involved.	 The	 function	 we	propose	 could	be	 implemented	by	a	 range	of	different	mechanisms.	Nonetheless,	 our	 account	predicts	that	the	main	achievements	in	episodic	memory	development	occur	as	a	consequence	of	 the	development	of	 retrieval	mechanisms.	Encoding	mechanisms	are	 important	 for	a	much	wider	 range	 of	 capacities,	 most	 of	 which	 are	 not	 in	 fact	 connected	 to	 our	 capacity	 to	communicate	about	the	past.		Second,	 we	 have	 argued	 that	 a	 metarepresentational	 format	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	representation	 of	 at	 least	 one	 type	 of	 past	 events	—	events	 that	 ground	 social	 commitments.	Both	 the	 ambiguity	 and	 the	 centrality	 of	 social	 commitments	 in	 human	 social	 life	 necessitate	efYicient	means	to	negotiate	them	communicatively.		There	 has	 been	 intense	 interest	 in	 the	 study	 of	 human	 memory	 and	 the	 cultural	 uses	 of	recollection	in	the	social	sciences	(a	‘memory	boom’,	Winter,	2001).	From	our	perspective,	it	is	not	surprising	that	remembering	should	be	of	central	interest	to	social	scientists.	After	all,	if	we	are	right,	episodic	memory	in	some	sense	enables	the	commitments	and	entitlements	that	make	up	the	web	of	social	relationships	we	are	embedded	in	both	as	individuals	and	as	members	of	social	 collectives.	 Indeed,	 the	 same	 kinds	 of	 justiYicatory	 practices	 that	 are	 used	 in	 the	negotiation	of	interpersonal	commitments	emerge	on	the	collective	level	in	how	past	events	and	their	 commemoration	 are	 used	 in	 the	 political	 arena	 in	 the	 negotiation	 of	 collective	commitments	and	entitlements	(e.g.,	Olick	&	Levy,	1997;	Pool	2008;	Weiss,	1997).	We	take	our	account	to	contribute	to	the	integration	of	these	different	perspectives	on	human	memory	and	its	uses.	Recollection,	far	from	being	the	intimately	private	affair	we	intuitively	take	it	to	be,	has	a	fundamentally	social	dimension.	
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